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Policing Executive Teamwork: Rescuing the
APA from Presidential Administration
William Powell*

ABSTRACT
The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) does not apply to the
President. In place of the well-known and well-defined procedural and
substantive requirements of the APA, a more limited “nonstatutory” form of
judicial review governs the President’s exercises of statutory authority.
Scholars have devoted many pages to debating what form nonstatutory review
of Presidential actions should take. But the President rarely acts alone. In
the era of Presidential Administration, our nation’s chief executive spends
much of her time telling bureaucrats what to do. In that context, this Article
takes up an essential predicate question: When the President acts with or
through an agency, how should a court distinguish between presidential
actions that are exempt from the APA and agency actions to which the APA
applies? This Article is the first to answer this important question.
A study of the caselaw reveals a split. The “last act” camp views the
rule that the APA doesn’t apply to the President primarily as a matter of
finality. Unless the President takes the last action in a sequence, the APA
applies. The “presidential nature” camp views the rule as more broadly tied
to the separation of powers, such that any action that is presidential in nature
(however that may be defined) is exempt from the APA.
This Article argues that while the former approach is overly formalistic
and may undermine the President’s authority, the latter approach poses an
existential threat to the existing regime of judicial review of agency action.
As the President increasingly exerts control over agencies, many significant
executive branch actions start to look “presidential,” which could, in turn,
limit judicial oversight. To save the APA from Presidential Administration
(as well as from the Unitary Executive Theory), this Article argues that the
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President’s APA exemption should be limited to her direct actions under
statutes that delegate authority to her by name. Otherwise, the APA should
apply to agency actions, regardless of the President’s involvement. At the
same time, courts applying “hard look” substantive review of agency action
should give greater leeway to political input from the Executive. This will
balance the desire for agencies to be politically accountable to the President
with the fundamental requirement that agencies act in accordance with law.
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INTRODUCTION
On November 20, 2014, President Barack Obama delivered a televised
address to the nation about immigration.1 After the failure of comprehensive
immigration reform legislation in 2013,2 the President announced that he
would use his own authority to make our “broken” immigration system “more
fair and more just.”3 Among the reforms he announced was a program called
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents
(“DAPA”), although he did not use that clunky title in his speech.4 Instead,
he pitched the program as needed “to deal responsibly with the millions of
undocumented immigrants who already live in our country.”5 He said that
immigration enforcement should target “felons, not families” and “criminals,
not children.”6 For undocumented immigrants who had been in the country
for more than five years, had children who were citizens or lawful permanent
residents, and could pass a criminal background check, he offered a “deal”:
they could “stay in this country temporarily without fear of deportation[,] . . .
come out of the shadows[,] and get right with the law.”7
The President’s speech made it crystal clear who was making these
changes: President Obama himself. He described the programs as “actions I
have the legal authority to take as President.”8 He doubled down on this point
throughout the address: “The actions I’m taking are not only lawful, they’re
the kinds of actions taken by every single Republican President and every
single Democratic President for the past half century.”9 The press coverage

1. Press Release, President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address
to the Nation on Immigration (Nov. 20, 2019), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov
/the-press-office/2014/11/20/remarks-president-address-nation-immigration
[perma.cc/VXP5-4R5V].
2. Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization
Act, S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013), https://www.congress.gov/bill/113thcongress/senate-bill/744.
3. President Obama, supra note 1.
4. Id. DAPA was meant to build on the success of its predecessor program,
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”), which protected immigrants
known as “Dreamers” who had come to the country as kids and met certain criteria,
such as seeking education or serving in the military. See Memorandum from Janet
Napolitano, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion
with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children to David
Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, et al. (June 15, 2012)
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretionindividuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [perma.cc/8J6G-NVPV].
5. President Obama, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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attributed the actions to the President. The headline in The New York Times
read, “Obama, Daring Congress, Acts to Overhaul Immigration.”10
But the policy memo announcing DAPA, issued that same day, was not
an executive order. Instead, Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson
announced DAPA in a memorandum to his subordinates.11 In the parlance of
administrative law, this was “guidance.” When Texas sued to stop DAPA, it
argued that the policy had not complied with the Administrative Procedure
Act’s notice and comment requirements for legislative rules.12 Principally on
that basis, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld an injunction
against the program,13 and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed by an equally
divided court.14
The result might have been different if President Obama had just
announced DAPA on his own letterhead. That’s because in Franklin v.
Massachusetts, the Supreme Court held that the APA does not apply to the
President.15 Instead, presidential actions are subject to what’s known as
“nonstatutory review.”16 The exact contours of nonstatutory review are the
subject of much scholarly and jurisprudential debate.17 At a minimum, it
includes review for whether the President’s action was unconstitutional or
without statutory authorization.18 It likely does not encompass any “hard
look” substantive review for whether the action is arbitrary and capricious.
10. Michael D. Shear, Obama, Daring Congress, Acts to Overhaul Immigration,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2014) https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/21/us/obamaimmigration-speech.html [perma.cc/X4XN-2ET9].
11. Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, Sec’y, Dept. of Homeland Sec. on
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the
United States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are the Parents
of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents to Leon Rodriguez, Director U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Servs. (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publ
ications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action_1.pdf [perma.cc/Z2MH-VAYS].
12. See Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 670–71 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
The difference between rules and guidance is beyond the scope of this paper. But the
basic argument was that guidance must be nonbinding, and DAPA was not as flexible
as it appeared on its face. Id. at 607–08.
13. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 188 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam,
136 S. Ct. 2771 (2016). The Fifth Circuit also purported to enjoin the program because
it was inconsistent with the Immigration and Nationality Act, but several other circuits
have subsequently disagreed with that aspect of the holding. See, e.g., Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 507 (9th Cir. 2018), cert.
granted, 139 S. Ct 2779 (2019) (mem); NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 218
(D.D.C. 2018), cert. granted before judgment, 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019).
14. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam).
15. 505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992).
16. Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
17. See infra Section I.C.
18. These are related and intertwined questions, because the Supreme Court often
interprets the strength of the President’s constitutional powers in a particular area
based on the extent of her statutory powers. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–39 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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And it certainly does not impose any procedural requirements, like the APA’s
notice and comment process. If DAPA had been an executive order, it might
have been invalidated on some other ground, but it would not have needed to
go through notice and comment.
This seems like an absurd result. The legal regime that applies to an
executive action should not be determined by the name on the letterhead.19
Yet as this DAPA hypothetical illustrates, it is difficult to apply a binary rule
to a nonbinary world. The APA applies to agencies; it doesn’t apply to the
President.20 That works fine at the poles of the spectrum when the President
or an agency act alone. But in an era of Presidential Administration, that is
becoming an increasingly rare circumstance. What about the multitude of
situations in which the President and agencies act together? Frequently, the
President issues an executive order telling an agency how to exercise its
statutory authority.21 Even more often, the President influences agency action
in more subtle ways, such as by meeting with agency heads or through
mandated cost-benefit analysis from the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (“OIRA”).22 Sometimes, Congress delegates authority to the
President, who redelegates it to an agency.23 Other times, Congress writes a
statute with a mixed delegation, telling an agency to act with oversight from
the President or the President to act through an agency.24 Does the APA apply
in those situations? All? None?
Scholars have not provided an answer. The literature on Presidential
Administration and the Unitary Executive Theory has championed greater
presidential authority over the administrative state without much
consideration of the implications for the APA. Now-Justice, then-Professor,
Elena Kagan’s pathbreaking article promoting greater political influence over
the administrative state devotes only a paragraph and a footnote to the
implications of her proposals for the scope of the President’s APA
exemption.25 Professor Kevin Stack has responded to Kagan with several
articles arguing that the President’s directive power over agencies should be
far more constrained.26 But he too has spent little time on how his proposals
19. As the DAPA anecdote demonstrates, the President is as politically
accountable for some administrative actions as for certain presidential ones. President
Obama’s speech gave him clear ownership of DAPA, regardless of who signed the
paper.
20. Franklin, 505 U.S. at 800–01.
21. See infra Section I.B.3
22. See infra Section I.B.2
23. See infra Section II.C.
24. See infra Section I.B.1
25. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2246, 2351
n.402 (2001).
26. Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws,
106 COLUM L. REV. 263 (2006) [hereinafter Stack, President’s Statutory Powers];
Kevin M. Stack, The Reviewability of the President’s Statutory Powers, 62 VAND. L.
REV. 1171 (2009) [hereinafter Stack, Reviewability]; Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory
President, 90 IOWA L. REV. 539 (2005) [hereinafter Stack, Statutory President].
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interact with Franklin. Likewise, scholarship on how nonstatutory review
should compare to APA review has largely ignored the predicate question of
how to draw the line between those two regimes.27 In short, the academic
literature often accepts the President’s APA exemption without much
interrogation of its limits and implications, instead focusing on the contours
of nonstatutory review. This Article is the first to address the predicate
question.28 It is also the first to comprehensively study the caselaw addressing
this important issue.
Courts have met the challenge with some confusion, and the caselaw is
split. Some courts, which this Article refers to as the “last act” camp, exempt
the President from the APA only when she takes the final action in a sequence
affecting the plaintiff’s rights.29 Other courts, which this Article calls the
“presidential nature” camp, exempt any action that is presidential in nature,
however that might be defined, even when the agency is the primary actor and
the President is only in the background.30 This Article argues that neither
approach is appropriate. The “last act” approach arguably misreads Franklin
and turns the President’s APA exemption into an empty formality. Worse,
the “presidential nature” approach poses an existential threat to the existing
structure of American administrative law. As the President becomes more
involved in directing agencies, his exemption from the APA could
significantly reduce judicial review of executive actions, undermining the
presumption of reviewability at the core of American administrative law.31
The purpose of the APA was to ensure “broad” and “generous” judicial review
of agency action.32 That purpose will not be realized if presidential
involvement is permitted to shield significant agency actions from APA
review.
The risk is not theoretical. President Trump has issued Executive Orders
at an unprecedented rate.33 Many of those orders, especially those in the
immigration context, simply direct agency heads on how to exercise their

27. See infra Section I.C.
28. One scholar has avoided the predicate question altogether by arguing that
Franklin should be overridden or overturned, but that too leaves open the question of
how to administer Franklin in the meantime. See Kathryn E. Kovacs, Constraining
the Statutory President, Wash. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2020).
29. See infra Section II.A.
30. See infra Section II.B.
31. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) (“[T]he
Administrative Procedure Act . . . embodies the basic presumption of judicial review
to one ‘suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action . . . .’”).
32. Id. at 140–41.
33. Chris Cillizza & Sam Petulla, Trump Is on Pace to Sign More Executive
Orders Than Any President in the Last 50 Years, CNN.COM (Oct. 13, 2017),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/13/politics/donald-trump-executive-orders/index.html
[perma.cc/M2UN-5T34].
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authorities. They use commanding language: “The Secretary shall . . . .” 34
As other scholars have noted, courts have struggled to decide what standards
apply in suits challenging those orders.35 And after its win in Trump v.
Hawaii,36 the government has argued that limited rational-basis review should
apply, instead of traditional APA arbitrary-and-capricious review, even to a
suit bringing APA claims against agency actions, so long as those actions were
influenced by the President.37 How far that argument can go is yet to be seen,
but courts are likely to encounter an increasing number of cases testing the
scope of Franklin v. Massachusetts. The Trump Administration’s efforts to
add a citizenship question to the census nearly set up a high-profile fight over
the President’s APA exemption. After the Supreme Court invalidated the
citizenship question under the APA’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard,38
President Trump briefly considered adding the question by executive order,
thereby using his APA exemption to circumvent the Court’s decision.39
Although Trump ultimately backed down on the citizenship question,40 a
showdown on the scope of Franklin is still looming.
In this Article, I propose the “agency nature” approach. Courts should
apply the APA whenever an agency acts pursuant to its own statutory powers
or exercises discretion that determines legal rights and obligations, regardless
of the President’s involvement. What matters is the nature of the action, rather
than any formalistic test based on finality or letterhead. But in accordance
with congressional intent in creating the APA, the separation of powers, and
traditional administrative law principles, the tie should go to the agency in
determining whether the action is that of an agency or the President. At the
same time, courts applying so-called “hard look” substantive review of agency
action should give greater leeway to political input from the Executive. This
solution enforces the separation of powers by balancing the President’s
politically legitimizing influence over agency action with the rule of law value
at stake when courts ensure executive fidelity to Congress’s statutory
directives.

34. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13767, Border Security and Immigration
Enforcement Improvements, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (2017).
35. See Lisa Manheim & Kathryn A. Watts, Reviewing Presidential Orders, 86
U. CHI. L. REV. 1743 (2019).
36. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
37. Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction and in Support of Motion to Dismiss, S.A. v. Trump, No. 18-CV-03539 LB
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2018). The Court in that case rejected the argument, at least at
the motion to dismiss stage. See S.A. v. Trump, 363 F. Supp. 1048, 1074–75 (D. Del.
2018) (applying the APA).
38. Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2568 (2019).
39. Kevin Liptak, et al., Trump Backs Away from Census Citizenship Question,
Orders Agencies to Hand Over Citizenship Information to Commerce, CNN.COM
(July 11, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/11/politics/trump-census-executiveaction/index.html [perma.cc/B4TG-TVQS].
40. Id.
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Part I details Franklin v. Massachusetts’ binary rule and why it is a poor
fit for the nonbinary world. It also explains the stakes of the choice between
judicial review regimes by contrasting APA and nonstatutory review. Part II
explores the current caselaw on what situations trigger the President’s APA
exemption. The lower courts are split, and the Supreme Court has avoided
the question for nearly 30 years. Part III offers my middle-ground proposal,
situates it within existing literature, and defends it from possible attack.

I. BINARY RULE, NONBINARY WORLD
This Part begins in Section I.A with a discussion of Franklin v.
Massachusetts, the case that created an exemption from the APA for the
President. That case arose in a unique context, one in which the President was
responsible for the final, discretionary act in a chain of administrative actions,
but it purports to create a blanket exemption for the President, regardless of
the order of operations. The peculiar circumstances under which the case
arose have caused problems for lower courts tasked with generalizing its
holding to more common factual scenarios in which the President acts through
subordinates. That Section further explores the somewhat vague separation
of powers concerns that led the Court to exempt the President.
Section I.B then explains the various ways in which the President is
involved in agency action (and that agencies are involved in presidential
action), which complicates the seemingly simple rule emerging from
Franklin. In an era of Presidential Administration, the President’s role in
agency action has increased significantly. And this could give the President’s
APA exemption greater purchase.
Section I.C further explains the differences between APA and
nonstatutory judicial review. If nonstatutory review largely replicated APA
review, then the choice between them would be of fairly little consequence.
Scholars have argued that nonstatutory review should approximate APA
review in certain respects, but I will argue, as other scholars have, that
nonstatutory review in its current form falls far short of APA review and is
insufficient to ensure the executive acts lawfully. For that reason, the choice
between APA and nonstatutory review for joint agency-presidential actions is
significant.

A. The Binary Rule
The rule that the APA applies to agencies but not to the President comes
from Franklin v. Massachusetts. Franklin concerned the statutory procedure
through which the Department of Commerce creates the decennial census and,
in turn, the President reports the census to Congress for the purposes of
reapportioning seats in the House of Representatives, as required by the
Constitution.41 After more than a century of delay-causing fights over
41. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 794–96 (1992). The Constitution
requires that Representatives “shall be apportioned among the several States . . .
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reapportionment, Congress acted in the early Twentieth Century to make the
process more self-executing.42 They sought to create a system in which the
number of Representatives would be determined by the Secretary of
Commerce and the President without action from Congress itself.43 The
resulting statutory scheme calls for the Secretary of Commerce to take the
census “in such form and content as he may determine.”44 The statute then
instructs the Secretary to send the President a tabulation of total population by
state as required for reapportionment within nine months of completion of the
Census.45 Then, the President “shall transmit” to Congress a statement of the
population of each state, as determined in the Census, as well as the number
of Representatives to which each state is entitled by the “method of equal
proportions.”46 Once the President sends his report to Congress, the Clerk of
the House of Representatives forwards it on to the states.47
Following the 1990 census, the State of Massachusetts sued the
Secretary of Commerce and the President.48 The state challenged the
Secretary’s decision, after much deliberation and some back and forth with
Congress, to count overseas military personnel at their “home of record.”49
That tweak to the count cost Massachusetts a seat in the House.50 As relevant
here, the state argued that the Secretary’s decision was arbitrary and
capricious under the APA.51 A three-judge district court panel agreed.52 It
ordered the Secretary to “eliminate the overseas federal employees from the
apportionment counts, directed the President to recalculate the number of
Representatives per State and transmit the new calculation to Congress, and

according to their respective Numbers,” to be calculated by “actual Enumeration,”
conducted every 10 years, “in such Manner as [Congress] shall by Law direct.” U.S.
CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
42. Franklin, 505 U.S. at 791–92.
43. Id.
44. 13 U.S.C. § 141(a) (2018). The Secretary has redelegated that authority to
the Census Bureau, as the statute permits.
45. Id. (“The tabulation of total population by States . . . as required for the
apportionment of Representatives in Congress . . . shall be completed within 9 months
after the census date and reported by the Secretary to the President of the United
States.”).
46. 2 U.S.C. § 2a(a) (2018) (directing that the President “shall transmit to the
Congress a statement showing the whole number of persons in each State . . . as
ascertained under the . . . decennial census of the population, and the number of
Representatives to which each State would be entitled under an apportionment of the
then existing number of Representatives by the method known as the method of equal
proportions . . . .”)
47. Id.
48. Franklin, 505 U.S. at 794–96.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 802.
51. Id. at 794–96.
52. Id. at 791.
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directed the Clerk of the House of Representatives to inform the States of the
change.”53 The Supreme Court reversed.54
Although all nine Justices agreed that the Secretary’s actions were
lawful, their reasoning differed sharply. Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the
Court commanded a bare five-Justice majority for its analysis of whether the
agency’s action was final and whether the APA applied to the President. The
Court centered its analysis on finality. That is, whether the Secretary’s
reporting of the census results to the President was “final agency action,”
which is required to trigger APA review.55 The Court held that under the
statutory procedure, it is the President, not the Secretary, who takes the final
action.56 Because the agency’s action was not final, it was not subject to
judicial review under the APA.57 The Court read the statute as allowing the
President to amend the census data, because the text does not explicitly dictate
that she must transmit the Secretary’s report to Congress, but instead suggests
the President is to generate her own statement of the state populations as
determined in the Census.58 That means the apportionment remains a
“moving target” for the states even after the Secretary has reported the data to
the President.59 It is not until the President sends her calculations to Congress
that “the target stops moving, because only then are the States entitled by [2
U.S.C.] § 2a to a particular number of Representatives.”60 Even if the
apportionment calculation itself is ministerial, the President has discretionary
authority to direct the Secretary to change the census, so legal rights are
unsettled until the President makes her report.61
Perhaps adding to later confusion among the lower courts, the Supreme
Court in Franklin emphasized that the President’s role in the process is “not
merely ceremonial or ministerial,” but the opinion did not say what the legal
significance of that is.62 The Court did not make clear whether the case would
come out differently were the President’s involvement in fact determined to
be ministerial.63 The implication at least is that were the President’s role
ministerial, then the Secretary’s actions would determine legal rights and
represent the end of the decision-making process. That would be final agency
action, even if it were not the last act in the chain.
Having determined that the final action, meaning the action subject to
judicial review, was that of the President, the Court turned to the question of
53. Id.
54. Id. at 806.
55. Id. at 796. The APA provides judicial review of “final agency action for
which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2018).
56. Franklin, 505 U.S. at 796.
57. Id. at 798.
58. Id. at 797.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 798.
61. Id. at 799.
62. Id. at 800.
63. Id.
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whether the APA applies to the President.64 It devoted only a single paragraph
to this important question.65 The APA defines “agency” to include “each
authority of the Government of the United States,” with a list of exceptions
that excludes Congress and the Courts from the definition but does not
mention the President.66 Even so, the Court observed that, although the
President is not explicitly excluded from the APA, “he is not explicitly
included either.”67 And given “the separation of powers and the unique
constitutional position of the President,” the Court refused to subject the
President to the APA absent a clear statement from Congress that it intended
to do so.68 Presidential actions could still be reviewed for compliance with
the Constitution, but they “are not reviewable for abuse of discretion under
the APA.”69 Thus, the “District Court erred in proceeding to determine the
merits of the APA claims.”70
Justice Stevens, joined by three other justices, concurred in part.71 He
joined the Court’s judgment because he thought the Secretary’s actions
satisfied the APA’s substantive requirements.72 But he disagreed that the
Secretary’s report to the President did not constitute final agency action.73
Justice Stevens argued that “[t]he plain language of the statute demonstrates
that the President has no substantive role in the computation of the census.”74
He took issue with the Court’s conclusion that the statute does not prohibit the
President from modifying the census results.75 Looking to the text of the
statutory scheme, the legislative history, and the practice of past Presidents,
he found no evidence suggesting that the President was to do anything other
than receive the Secretary’s report, make the apportionment calculation, and
then transfer both the census data and apportionment calculation to
Congress.76 This suggests that, at least in the view of four justices, an
agency’s action can be final even when the President takes a later action, so
long as that action is ministerial. Because Justice Stevens would have held
that the agency’s action was final, “it [was] unnecessary . . . to consider
whether the President [was] an ‘agency’ within the meaning of the APA.”77

64. Id. at 800–01.
65. Id.
66. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2018).
67. Franklin, 505 U.S. at 800.
68. Id. at 800–01.
69. Id. at 801.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 807 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment,
joined by Blackmun, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 808.
74. Id. at 810.
75. Id. at 810–11.
76. Id. at 816.
77. Id. at 816 n.15.
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Justice Scalia wrote a separate concurrence that was primarily concerned
with standing and, with respect to the redressability aspect of the standing
analysis, remedies against the President.78 In that context, he addressed the
possibility of obtaining judicial review of a President’s allegedly illegal acts.79
First, Justice Scalia concluded that insofar as the District Court’s injunction
ran against the President, the Court had overstepped the separation of
powers.80 He wrote succinctly: “I think it clear that no court has authority to
direct the President to take an official act.”81 In this context, he briefly
addressed how a person could still obtain judicial review of presidential
actions – suits against subordinate officers who carry out the President’s
orders.82 “Review of the legality of Presidential action can ordinarily be
obtained,” Justice Scalia wrote, “in a suit seeking to enjoin the officers who
attempt to enforce the President’s directive.”83
As discussed in more detail later in this Article, Justice Scalia’s
invocation of the officer suit has ambiguous implications for when the APA
should apply to the President. The officer suit is best known as a workaround
for sovereign immunity. You can’t sue the state of Minnesota, which enjoys
immunity under the 11th Amendment, but under Ex Parte Young, you can sue
the officers of the state who execute its laws.84 One possible reading of Justice
Scalia’s concurrence is that there is absolutely no direct judicial review of the
President’s discretionary acts, and the only way to get even nonstatutory
review is to sue a subordinate officer. (Yet many federal courts have directly
enjoined President Trump’s executive orders.)85 Another reading is that a
challenger can obtain APA review of presidential actions by waiting and suing
the implementing agent or agency.
These two interpretations of Justice Scalia’s concurrence illustrate the
all or nothing problems generated by a binary rule. On the former reading,
whenever the President orders an agency to act, he wipes out APA review.
On the latter reading, the President’s exemption from the APA is meaningless
in the ninety-nine percent of situations in which the President acts through an
agent, because APA review can be obtained by simply waiting for a
subordinate officer to carry out the President’s orders. Finding middle ground

78. Id. at 823–29 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 825–26.
81. Id. at 826 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Scalia did leave open the possibility that the President might be enjoined to take a
purely ministerial action. Id. But he agreed with the majority that sending the census
and apportionment figures to Congress was a discretionary, rather than a ministerial
act. Id. at 824.
82. Id. at 828.
83. Id. (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)).
84. See generally Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), superseded by statute,
Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721.
85. See e.g., Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1164–65 (9th Cir. 2017).
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between these poles while remaining faithful to Franklin’s premise that the
President is exempt from the APA has proved difficult.
Before moving on, a few subsequent Supreme Court decisions that help
frame Franklin merit at least brief mention. The Court affirmed the
President’s exemption from the APA and again held that an agency’s action
is not final when it is followed by a discretionary presidential act in Dalton v.
Specter.86 The Court also held that where a decision is committed to the
President’s discretion, even nonstatutory review is unavailable.87
The case involved another complex multi-step statutory process that
vested decision-making in an agency, a separate independent commission, the
The Defense Base Closure and
President, and finally Congress.88
Realignment Act of 1990 aimed to create a politically feasible method for
closing military bases.89 The statute required the Secretary of Defense to
prepare recommendations for base closure and realignment, pursuant to
criteria promulgated through notice and comment rulemaking.90 The
Secretary submitted those recommendations to Congress and to the
independent Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, whose
eight members were appointed by the President.91 The Commission then
submitted a report with its own recommendations for closure and realignment
to the President.92 At that point, the President could decide whether to
approve or disapprove the Commission’s recommendations in their entirety.93
It was an all-or-nothing proposition. If the President disapproved the
Commission’s recommendations, the process would repeat itself, and if the
President disapproved a second time, then no bases would be closed.94 If
however the President approved the Commission’s recommendations, the
President would submit the recommendations and her certification of approval
to Congress, which would have forty-five days to enact a joint resolution of
disapproval.95 If such a resolution did not pass, only then could the Secretary
close the bases.96
In 1991, this process produced a decision to close the Philadelphia Naval
Shipyard.97 Plaintiffs, including Pennsylvania Senator Arlen Specter, sued to
enjoin the closure of the base, arguing that the Secretary and the Commission
86. 511 U.S. 462, 476–77 (1994).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 464–66.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 465.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 466. That is, the Secretary recommended the closure, the Commission
also recommended the closure, the President approved the closure, and Congress
rejected a joint resolution of disapproval of the closure. Id.
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violated the APA and the 1990 Act.98 The Supreme Court reversed the Third
Circuit and held that neither the agencies’ nor the President’s actions were
subject to judicial review under the APA.99 This reaffirmed the holding of
Franklin. Actions by the Secretary and the Commission were unreviewable
under the APA because they were not final agency actions.100 Their
recommendations carried no legal consequences for the affected parties until
the President decided whether to approve.101 The President’s action was final
but still unreviewable under the APA because the APA does not apply to the
President.102 The Court devoted a mere one sentence to this latter conclusion,
citing Franklin without expanding on that case’s rationale for excluding the
President from the APA’s coverage.103
The Court in Dalton also went a step further in holding that nonstatutory
review of presidential action is not available for decisions committed to the
President’s discretion.104 The Court first noted that the statutory claims in the
case did not fall within Franklin’s additional holding that presidential actions
are reviewable for constitutionality outside the APA.105 The Court then
assumed “for the sake of argument that some claims that the President has
violated a statutory mandate are judicially reviewable outside the framework
of the APA,” but held that “such review is not available when the statute in
question commits the decision to the discretion of the President.”106 Here,
although the statute gave the President no power to amend the list of bases to
be closed, it gave him completely unfettered discretion in deciding to accept
or reject the recommendations.107 Therefore, judicial review was not
appropriate.108 Significantly, that same result might have been reached had
the APA applied to the President because Section 701(a)(2) precludes judicial
review of decisions “committed to agency discretion by law.”109 Ultimately,
98. Id.
99. Id. at 467–68.
100. Id. at 469–70.
101. Id. at 469.
102. Id. at 470–71.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 474.
105. Id. at 473–74.
106. Id. at 474.
107. Id. at 476.
108. Id. at 476–77.
109. 5 U.S.C. § 702(a)(2) (2018). Below, I will explain various ways in which
nonstatutory and APA judicial review are not so well aligned. It is noteworthy that
the President’s APA exemption so frequently arises in the context of deciding whether
an agency’s action is final, because it illustrates how often the President works
together with agencies. If the President usually worked alone, his APA exemption
would stand on its own. But because the President is usually working with an agency,
and because plaintiffs are in the habit of suing every possible defendant, the
President’s APA exemption often functions as a limitation on review of agency action
deemed not final, in addition to a limitation on review of the President’s own actions.
That is, the President’s APA exemption is often invoked in the context of an argument
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the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims that failure to provide judicial review
would repudiate Marbury v. Madison’s imperative that every right deserves a
remedy.110 “The judicial power of the United States conferred by Article III
of the Constitution is upheld just as surely by withholding judicial relief where
Congress has permissibly foreclosed it, as it is by granting such relief where
authorized by the Constitution or by statute.”111
In subsequent decisions on finality, the Supreme Court has both clarified
and seemingly loosened the finality requirements applied in Franklin. The
Court created the currently prevailing two-pronged test for finality in Bennett
v. Spear: agency action is final when it (1) marks the consummation of the
agency’s decision-making process, rather than being tentative and (2) is an
action that determines rights and obligations or from which legal
consequences will flow.112 That test could lead to the same conclusion in
Franklin, on the theory that the consequences did not flow until the President
made his report to Congress. But in applying the Bennett test, the Court has
found certain actions to be “final” within the meaning of the APA without
requiring that it be the last in the chain of administrative actions.113 In Bennett
itself, the Court deemed final a Biological Opinion from the Fish and Wildlife
Service, even though it was technically only “advisory” and a separate “action
agency” made the final determination, because the Opinion had “a powerful
coercive effect.”114 Likewise, in the more recent case U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers v. Hawkes, the Court held that a Jurisdictional Determination
(“JD”) from the Army Corps that certain land constitutes “waters of the United
States” was final agency action even though the determination just meant the
owner needed a permit from the EPA to develop the land.115 A permit would
have been required even without the JD, which just clarifies the owner’s
status.116 The Court held that the denial of a safe harbor was enough to
constitute legal consequences.117 Even if those holdings cast some doubt on
the finality analysis in Franklin (and it’s unclear whether they do), that would
at most remove one context in which the President’s APA exemption is
relevant. But of course, it won’t always be the case that an agency acts first
followed by the President, which happened to be the order of operations

from the government that an agency’s action wasn’t final because of the President’s
involvement.
110. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 162 (1803).
111. Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 477 (1994).
112. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997).
113. Id. at 168–69.
114. Id. at 169. In this section of the its opinion, the Bennett Court distinguished
Franklin and Dalton on the grounds that the agency reports in those cases were “purely
advisory and in no way affected the legal rights of the relevant actors.” Id. at 178.
115. 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1813–14 (2016).
116. Id. at 1814–15.
117. Id. at 1814.
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presented in both Franklin and Dalton.118 As discussed in the next Section,
the President’s APA exemption is also relevant when the President orders an
agency to use its statutory discretion in a certain way or when the President
redelegates his own statutory authority to an agency, among other examples.

B. The Nonbinary World
This Section discusses the difficulty of applying Franklin’s binary rule
to a nonbinary world in which teamwork between agencies and the President
is pervasive. Even at the time Franklin was decided, the diverse statutory
schemes under which the President and agencies share authority made the
binary rule simple in theory but difficult in practice. One example is what
Kevin Stack has identified as “mixed delegations,” instances in which
Congress explicitly delegates authority to the President and agencies
together.119 Another is a type of subdelegation, in which Congress first
delegates authority to the President, often ostensibly anticipating that she
won’t keep that authority for herself, and the President then delegates that
power to an agency.120 And executive teamwork is trending upward: The
growing body of scholarship on what Justice Kagan coined Presidential
Administration has documented that instances of presidential-agency
teamwork are increasingly common.121 Collaboration has become the rule,
not the exception, especially if one includes OIRA’s cost-benefit analysis of
agency rules and major guidance documents within the definition of
“executive teamwork.”122 Finally, the Unitary Executive Theory, another
prominent body of scholarship, is also relevant to the President’s APA
exception. Under this theory, the President possesses the power to control the
entire Executive Branch and can direct policymaking by all executive
agencies within congressionally set limits.123 If that’s true, the already blurry
line between agency action and presidential action may be blown away
entirely.

1. Mixed Delegations and Subdelegations
In numerous statutory schemes, Congress has explicitly delegated
authority to both the President and one or more agencies.124 Many of these
laws were passed after the APA and before Franklin, such that it seems
118. See generally Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992); Dalton v.
Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994).
119. Stack, President’s Statutory Powers, supra note 26, at 268.
120. Id. at 268 n.202.
121. Kagan, supra note 25, at 2326–28.
122. See generally id.
123. Stack, President’s Statutory Powers, supra note 26, at 266–67; see also
Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 113, 1165–66 (1992).
124. Stack, President’s Statutory Powers, supra note 26, at 268.
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reasonable to infer that Congress may have assumed that the APA would
govern at least the agency’s actions under the statutes. But in identifying and
discussing these mixed delegations, no scholar has suggested whether the
APA ought to apply to actions taken pursuant to mixed delegations, a
significant gap in the literature.
In the context of arguing against the Presidential Administration theories
discussed in the next Section, Kevin Stack’s scholarship has identified what
he calls “mixed agency-President delegations.”125 These are statutes that
“condition the grant of authority to either the President or the agency on the
approval, direction, control, findings, or involvement of the other.”126 Stack
breaks these mixed delegations into two categories. The first he calls
“conditional delegations,” which authorize agents to act subject to the
President’s control.127 These are statutes that empower agencies to act “with
the approval of,” “with the approbation of,” or “under the direction of” the
President.128 Stack marshals examples from the earliest days of the republic
through modern times. A 1789 statute directed the Secretary of War to
“conduct the business of the said department in such manner, as the President
of the United States shall from time to time order and instruct.”129 Today, to
borrow a few more examples from Stack, the Secretary of Agriculture has
rulemaking authority over agricultural production “with the approval of the
President”130; the Secretary of the Interior can use federal resources to
construct water conservation projects “in such manner as the President may

125. Id. Stack argues, contra both Presidential Administration and Unitary
Executive theories, that because Congress knows how to give the President power
over agency action when it so desires, the President can take over an agency’s statutory
authority or direct agencies in how to exercise their statutory authority only when
Congress expressly delegates such power to the President. Id. at 278. Put differently,
delegations only to agencies do not impliedly give the President “directive authority”
over the agencies’ exercise of their statutory power. Id. at 284. Going a step further,
Stack contends that like an agency, the President should receive Chevron deference
only for those statutes that she “administers,” meaning those statutes that explicitly
grant power to her. Id. at 291. This conclusion stands against Kagan’s argument that
presidential direction of agency action should be a prerequisite for Chevron deference.
See Kagan, supra note 20, at 2372–73. If a statute does not explicitly grant directive
power to the President, Stack argues that her executive orders cannot legally bind
lower officials. Stack, President’s Statutory Powers, supra note 26, at 268. Rather,
the agency owes the President only a form of Skidmore deference in considering her
policy preferences. But see Nina A. Mendelson, Another Word on the President’s
Statutory Authority Over Agency Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2455, 2457–58 (2011)
(arguing that Stack is wrong to read explicit delegations to the President as implied
proof that Congress did not intend to grant directive authority to the President in
statutes delegating authority to only an agency).
126. Stack, President’s Statutory Powers, supra note 26, at 276.
127. Id. at 278.
128. Id. at 268.
129. Id. at 323 n.68.
130. 7 U.S.C. § 610(c) (2018).
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direct”131; and the Secretary of Transportation may suspend the permits of
foreign air carriers without a hearing but “subject to the approval of the
President.”132
The second category of mixed delegations is what Stack calls “agencyspecified delegations” to the President.133 These are statutes that grant power
to the President but direct her to act through or on the recommendation of a
specific agent.134 Current statutes authorize the President “through the
Secretary of Labor” to develop policies for addressing unemployment135 and
instruct that the President “should direct the Secretary of State” with respect
to international research on climate change.136 In a 2002 statute on border
security and visas, Congress defined the term “President” as “the President of
the United States, acting through the Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Commissioner of
Immigration and Naturalization, the Attorney General” and several other
officials.137 If that’s the definition of President, good luck applying Franklin.
Subdelegations can present similar challenges. As relevant here,
subdelegation occurs when Congress delegates statutory power to the
President who in turn redelegates that power to an agency.138 Scholars have
argued that when Congress delegates power to the President in name, it is
often, or even usually, with the possibility of subdelegation in mind.139
Congress knows that the President cannot execute many administrative
programs on her own, but it wants her to play a coordinating role by
redelegating the authority to the most effective actors within the
administrative state.140 On this view, a delegation directly to an agency is not
a limitation on the President’s power to control that agency’s action, but
rather, a limitation on the President’s authority to choose which agency has
authority to implement the statute.141

131. 16 U.S.C. § 590z (2018).
132. 49 U.S.C. § 41304(b) (2018).
133. Stack, President’s Statutory Powers, supra note 26, at 282.
134. Id.
135. 15 U.S.C. § 3116(a) (2018).
136. § 2952(a).
137. Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-173, § 2(6), 116 Stat. 543, 544 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1701(6)). In his signing
statement, President Bush objected to this language on Constitutional grounds, but
only because he thought the Take Care Clause and the “unitary executive” should give
him greater power to direct agencies than the statute allowed. Press Release, President
George W. Bush, Statement by the President on H.R. 3525 (May 15, 2002),
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/05/text/200205158.html [perma.cc/3W4Q-EQ4B].
138. As just one example, the President has redelegated his statutory authority to
approve international bridges, which I discuss at length in Section II.C.
139. Kagan, supra note 25, at 2329.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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This argument is consistent with the Presidential Subdelegation Act,
which explicitly authorizes the President to redelegate her statutory powers.142
It finds additional support in historical practice. In the early days of American
bureaucracy, Congress delegated almost all administrative power to the
President in name. At that point in history, it was well understood that the
President would not wield most of that power herself but would instead do so
through agents. (The holding in Franklin is arguably inconsistent with this
history, because the majority opinion assumes Congress intends for the
President to personally wield the power given to her by name.) But over the
course of the Twentieth Century, Congress came to delegate more and more
authority directly to agencies, reducing the power of the President to oversee
agency action. The trend toward Presidential Administration, discussed in the
next Section, could be seen as an effort by the President to take back that
power over the structure of her own branch of government.
In cases of redelegation, the President might play no role at all in the
agency’s subsequent action. Should Congress’s original decision to delegate
power to the President be enough – given the President’s unique constitutional
position – to insulate any action taken pursuant to that statute from the APA
even when the President plays no part? Courts have faced exactly that
question in a series of cases applying Franklin to permits for cross-border
development projects issued by agencies pursuant to power redelegated to
them by the President. Section II.C looks at these cases in greater detail, but
the bottom line is that, like mixed delegations, subdelegations make applying
Franklin difficult.

2. Presidential Administration and the Unitary Executive
Academic theories about Presidential Administration and the Unitary
Executive argue for enhancing the President’s role in directing agency action,
the former as a matter of policy prudence and the latter as a matter of
constitutional mandate.143 The binary rule seems at least somewhat
inconsistent with these notions. And as the structure and function of the
executive branch evolves to embody those theories, the binary rule becomes
more difficult to administer and more problematic for fans of executive
accountability.
Most readers are likely familiar with then-Professor Kagan’s
pathbreaking article, so I will provide only a brief sketch of the more relevant
points. Descriptively, through a case study of the Clinton Administration, she

142. 3 U.S.C. § 301 (2018) (authorizing the President to designate any Senateconfirmed executive branch official to perform statutory functions vested in the
President); see also Mendelson, supra note 125, at 2464 (“The Presidential
Subdelegation Act communicates Congress’s understanding that, notwithstanding its
use of the word ‘President’ in authorizing statutes, agencies could properly implement
the statutes with no presidential involvement whatsoever. Instead, it is simply the
President’s choice how much to supervise, direct, or approve.”).
143. Kagan, supra note 25, at 2326.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss1/6

20

Powell: Policing Executive Teamwork:

2020]

EXECUTIVE TEAMWORK

91

argued that Presidents have increasingly made the administrative state an
extension of their own political and policy agendas.144 They have
accomplished this through greater directive authority over agencies and by
taking ownership of regulatory activity.145 (Obama’s DAPA speech discussed
in the Introduction might be one example of the latter.) Kagan argued that
this greater presidential control over agency action is lawful because explicit
delegations to agencies are also implicit delegations to the President.146
Unlike the Unitary Executive theorists discussed in the next Section, Kagan
argued that Congress has the power to delegate authority to an agency actor
alone, to the exclusion of the President, but she interpreted simple delegations
to agency actors as not including such a limitation.147 The structure and norms
of the executive branch also give the President significant influence over
executive agencies, most explicitly through his power of appointment and
removal, but in more practical ways as well, such as in his role coordinating
efforts between agencies.148 Therefore, “when Congress delegates to an
executive official, it in some necessary and obvious sense also delegates to
the President.”149 Normatively, Kagan argued that the President’s increased
control is good, enhancing both accountability and effectiveness.150 Possible
tradeoffs between politics and expertise should not be overstated, she argued,
because so much of administrative decision-making involves value
judgments, rather than pure scientific expertise, and bureaucrats lack the
political mandate to impose their value judgments without the President’s
oversight.151 Kagan did not specify exactly how far the President’s control
over an agency can extend, such as whether the President could publish a rule
in the Federal Register against the wishes of the agency head responsible for
implementing it.152
To facilitate Presidential Administration, Kagan argued for tweaks to the
judicial review doctrines.153 Traditionally, courts reviewing agency actions
have been somewhat skeptical of political influence, especially when political
motivations lead an agency to change a preexisting policy.154 On the contrary,
144. Id. at 2272–319.
145. Id. at 2284–99.
146. Id. at 2319–31.
147. Id. Kagan reads “a standard delegation [to an executive agency] as including
the President, unless Congress indicates otherwise.” Id. at 2327.
148. Id. at 2275.
149. Id. at 2327
150. Id. at 2331–46.
151. Id. at 2353.
152. Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision
Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1133 n.20 (2010).
153. Kagan, supra note 25, at 2372–83.
154. See Fed. Commc’n Comm’n v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502,
513 (2009); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Tummino v.
Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 547 (E.D.N.Y 2009). Beyond skepticism, courts will
invalidate agency action when political pressure leads to an agency decision based on
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Kagan argued that the President’s legitimating political influence should be
embraced.155 She would condition Chevron deference on “the political
leadership and accountability that the President offers.”156 Only those
interpretations over which the President exercised actual control would
receive deference.157 Similarly, she would relax substantive “hard-look”
review of agency actions where “demonstrable evidence shows that the
President has taken an active role in, and by so doing has accepted
responsibility for, the administrative decision in question.”158 In short, an
agency acting with presidential direction would receive more deference in its
interpretations and weaker judicial oversight of its decisions.159
Granting such legal significance to the President’s directive control over
agencies complicates the President’s APA exemption. Once the President’s
“political leadership and accountability” is required to legitimate agency
action, it becomes more difficult to distinguish agency action from
presidential action.160 Even if the line were still clear, it would be more
difficult to justify drawing one. If separation of powers concerns militate
against judicial review of the President passing along an agency’s report to
Congress, as in Franklin, one might think they would be equally or even more
forceful when the President makes important value judgments to shape an
agency’s regulatory agenda or decide a contentious question of policy.
The Unitary Executive Theory161 is related to Kagan’s arguments, and
its relevance to my arguments is similar. In its strongest form, Unitary
Executive Theory poses even bigger problems for the Franklin binary than
does Presidential Administration, but these problems remain more theoretical.
Simply put, Unitary Executive Theory relies on the fact that Article II, Section
1 of the Constitution vests the executive power of the United States in the
President alone.162 She, therefore, must have complete control over her
agents. And in part because of the President’s constitutional power to remove
the heads of agencies, any power given to the executive branch is the

reasons or factors that are irrelevant under the authorizing statute. D.C. Fed’n of Civic
Ass’ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
155. Kagan, supra note 25, at 2375–76.
156. Id. at 2376.
157. Id. at 2376–77.
158. Id. at 2380.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See generally Stephen G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s
Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 595 (1994); Martin S. Flaherty, The
Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996); Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent
Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41; but see Peter L. Strauss, Foreword: Overseer, or
“The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696,
702–03 (2007); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the
Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994).
162. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America.”).
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President’s to wield.163 As leading Unitary Executive theorists Stephen
Calabresi and Saikrishna B. Prakash put it, “the President has a constitutional
right to take action in the place of an inferior officer to whom a statute purports
to give discretionary executive power.”164 If the executive branch is truly
unitary, if the executive branch is the President, then a doctrine applying the
APA to agencies but not the President is nonsense. It creates a distinction
where none can possibly exist. Of course, this strong version of the Unitary
Executive Theory is inconsistent with more current administrative law
doctrine than just Franklin. It would also suggest, for instance, that
independent agencies are unconstitutional. But even if Unitary Executive
Theory remains, to a large extent, just a theory, its implications for the
President’s APA exemption are worth considering.165
The merits of the dispute between Kagan and Stack are beyond the scope
of this paper. Ultimately, they both make persuasive arguments, and their
disagreement is one about the default rule for statutory interpretation. Setting
aside the constitutional arguments of Unitary Executive theorists, Kagan and
Stack would likely agree that Congress has the power to either limit the
President’s directive authority over agency action, for instance by creating an
independent agency, or to give the President directive authority, for instance
by conditioning the agency’s authority on presidential approval. The question
is how to read the vast majority of statutes that are silent on directive authority.
Kagan argues that the normative desirability of presidential oversight of
executive agencies supports interpreting simple delegations to agencies as
including the President – and Stack argues the opposite.166 What matters for
this Article is the scholars’ descriptive observations: between mixed
delegations and Presidential Administration, the President’s role in the
administrative state is growing. Whether that’s good or bad, it complicates
the Franklin analysis. The next Section takes a closer look at presidential
administration in practice.

3. Explosion of Presidential Administration in Practice
It bears repeating that the tension between executive teamwork and the
President’s APA exemption is not just theoretical. As explored in Part II,
lower courts have already taken on this challenge in several cases, reaching
inconsistent results. And the frequency with which the issue presents itself is
increasing rapidly. As Kagan documents, starting with President Reagan and

163. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 161, at 599 (“[T]he President must be able
to control subordinate executive officers through the mechanisms of removal,
nullification, and execution of the discretion ‘assigned’ to them himself.”).
164. Id. at 595.
165. Another possibly relevant argument, from Jack Goldsmith and John
Manning, suggests that the President has a “completion power” to go beyond
(although not against) statutory mandates. See Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning,
The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280, 2297 (2006).
166. Kagan, supra note 25, at 2340.
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expanding in particular under President Clinton, Presidents have been
exerting greater directive control over agency actions.167 The extent of
presidential administration has exploded even further since Kagan’s article
was published. President Obama issued numerous executive orders,
directives, and memoranda that told agencies how to exercise their authority,
including on such matters as student debt,168 retirement savings,169 and
overtime pay.170 Building on this practice by his predecessors, President
Trump has used executive orders more aggressively than any President in
history to direct agency action, especially in the field of immigration.171 His
orders have directed agencies on policies regarding refugee admissions and
travel from certain countries,172 sanctuary cities,173 and military service by
transgender individuals,174 among others. The resulting wave of lawsuits
challenging those executive orders and the agency actions implementing them
brings the issue to the fore. To put it another way, Presidents since Reagan
have engaged in a concerted effort to blur the line between presidential and
agency action. Franklin traced its rule along a line that no longer exists. It is
a binary rule in a nonbinary world.

167. Id. at 2272–319.
168. Memorandum from President Barack Obama on Federal Student Loan
Repayments to the Sec’y of the Treasury and the Sec’y of Labor (June 9, 2014),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/09/presidentialmemorandum-federal-student-loan-repayments [perma.cc/4PZX-Y5HQ].
169. Memorandum from President Barack Obama on Retirement Savings Security
to
the
Sec’y
of
the
Treasury
(Jan.
28,
2014),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/28/presidentialmemorandum-retirement-savings-security [perma.cc/6JW7-GZ8C].
170. Memorandum from President Barack Obama on Updating and Modernizing
Overtime Regulations to the Sec’y of Labor (March 13, 2014)
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/13/presidential-memorandumupdating-and-modernizing-overtime-regulations [perma.cc/5SGE-K58N] (directing
the Secretary of Labor “to propose revisions to modernize and streamline the existing
overtime regulations”)
171. See, e.g., the so-called “travel ban” orders: Protecting the Nation from
Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg.
8977 (Jan. 27, 2017); Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the
United States, Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 9, 2017);
Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017).
172. See supra note 165.
173. Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order No.
13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
174. Memorandum from President Donald Trump on Military Service by
Transgender Individuals to the Sec’y of Def. and the Sec’y of Homeland Sec. (Aug.
25,
2017)
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidentialmemorandum-secretary-defense-secretary-homeland-security/
[perma.cc/K7J2WDY8].
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C. Why It Matters: Differences Between APA and Nonstatutory
Review
This Section looks at the significant differences between APA and
nonstatutory review. If the nonstatutory review that applies to the President
and the APA review that applies to agencies were largely interchangeable, the
choice between those regimes when the President and agencies work together
would be largely semantic. The problems posed by implementing Franklin’s
binary rule in the nonbinary world would be of little practical significance.
But nonstatutory review and APA review are not close substitutes. Other
scholars, Stack chief among them, have written extensively about what
nonstatutory review of presidential action should look like. But what does it
entail under current doctrine? Lisa Marshall Manheim and Kathryn A. Watts
address this question in detail.175 In short, they found “existing judicial
precedents [do not] provide anything close to a well-developed or coherent
legal framework for courts to follow when reviewing presidential orders.”176
They therefore call for “a cohesive framework to guide judicial review of
presidential orders,” which “would best be formed through deliberative
discussion among scholars, judges, litigants, and members of Congress.”177
The Supreme Court has never used nonstatutory review178 to issue an
injunction against the President.179 Thus, most scholarly analysis of
nonstatutory review of presidential action rests on rather speculative
foundations.180 One thing that can be said with confidence: Franklin itself
held that even when the APA does not apply, judicial review is available to
decide whether presidential action complies with the Constitution.181 But the
extent of nonstatutory review for violations of statutory law remains unclear.
The plaintiffs in Dalton v. Specter tried to smuggle statutory claims into
175. See Manheim & Watts, supra note 35. Their article aims to start a
conversation about what form nonstatutory review should take in lawsuits challenging
Presidential action, but again without much consideration of the predicate question of
how to distinguish presidential action from agency action. As the authors explain in
their abstract, nonstatutory review has become particularly important because “Donald
Trump’s entrance into the White House . . . prompted an explosion of lawsuits that
took direct and immediate aim at presidential orders involving everything from
sanctuary cities to transgender troops.” Id. at 1743. Many of those lawsuits, including
the travel ban litigation, also name various agency actors as defendants.
176. Id. at 1747.
177. Id. at 1748.
178. The name “nonstatutory review” itself can be misleading. It means that the
cause of action comes from the common law, rather than a statute like the APA. But
the substantive claims can include violations of statutes.
179. See Jonathan R. Siegel, Suing the President: Nonstatutory Review Revisited,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 1612, 1612 (1997).
180. See generally id.
181. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 801 (1992). The Court, however,
dismissed the challengers’ constitutional claims on the merits. Id.; see also Webster
v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603–05 (1988).
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Franklin’s carveout for constitutional claims by arguing that the President
violates the constitutional separation of powers whenever she exceeds her
statutory authority.182 But the Court rejected that argument, distinguishing
between true constitutional claims and those asserting an official has exceeded
statutory authority.183 Instead, the Court in Dalton assumed without deciding
“that some claims that the President has violated a statutory mandate are
judicially reviewable outside the framework of the APA.”184 But because the
Court found that the statutory authority in question was committed to the
President’s discretion, it left a decision on the scope of nonstatutory review of
statutory claims for another day.185
In the absence of clear Supreme Court precedent, the lower courts have
struggled to set the bounds of nonstatutory review. The leading case, which
comes from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, is Chamber of
Commerce v. Reich.186 In that case, the plaintiffs sued President Clinton
arguing that an executive order regulating government contracting violated
the National Labor Relations Act.187 The court held that even absent a
statutory cause of action, like the one provided by the APA, nonstatutory
review was available for claims that the executive acted in excess of statutory
authority.188 Congress intends for the executive to follow its laws, and a court
failing to enforce the law would leave private parties subject to arbitrary
power.189 The court, therefore, enjoined the executive order.190 Other lower
courts, however, have rejected the holding in Reich and instead decided that
nonstatutory review is not available for claims that the President exceeded
statutory authority.191
Based on Franklin, Dalton, and Reich, it seems likely that nonstatutory
review requires at least adherence to the Constitution and to clear statutory
mandates. But certain aspects of the APA are either definitely not included,
like procedural requirements (think notice and comment), or probably not
included, like rationality review (testing whether an action is arbitrary and
capricious). Perhaps more significantly, even if nonstatutory review includes
some of the same substantive features as APA review, nonstatutory review is
less reliable. In part, this is because of a difference in the amount of available
precedent. Cases imposing nonstatutory review on executive actions have
appeared with greater frequency in the Trump era – but remain sparse.
182. Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 472 (1994).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 474.
185. Id. at 476–77.
186. 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
187. Id. at 1324.
188. Id. at 1327–29.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1339.
191. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Dep’t of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1997),
aff’d, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999), reh’g granted and opinion withdrawn, (9th Cir.
1999).
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Plaintiffs seeking to challenge an agency’s action under the APA have much
more information about what doctrines will apply. That makes APA litigation
far more consistent and certain.192 Further, suits seeking nonstatutory review
are more likely to run into prudential roadblocks than suits that proceed under
the APA, which provides a cause of action and waiver of sovereign immunity.
For these reasons, a decrease in the availability of the APA for challenging
agency action in which the President is involved will lead to weaker judicial
review, even when nonstatutory review is available.

1. Lack of Clarity
The scope of APA review is relatively clear. Every day, courts across
the country issue opinions interpreting the APA and the administrative law
doctrines that have grown up around it. Litigants bringing suits under the
APA know what to expect in a variety of areas: exhaustion requirements,
preclusion doctrine, interpretive deference regimes, and hard-look substantive
review. The scope of nonstatutory review, however, is far less clear. The
Sections that follow explain the possible scope of nonstatutory review based
on the information available, but the case law is sparse and inconsistent. This
is not a surprise. Although nonstatutory review predates the APA, once the
APA provided a cause of action and waiver of sovereign immunity for
litigants to challenge agency action, they didn’t have much use for
nonstatutory review. That meant that during the regulatory revolution of the
Twentieth Century, when the field of administrative law went from an
afterthought to the main event, no new precedent on nonstatutory review was
being developed. Only the combination of Franklin’s exempting the
President from the APA with the rise of Presidential Administration brought
nonstatutory review back into the frame. Even then, both litigants and courts
are drawn to relying on traditional administrative law doctrine, that is, APA
doctrine, because it is what they know. For that reason, plaintiffs seeking to
challenge a presidential order will usually also name implementing agents in
their suits so they can bring APA claims. Even when courts find that the APA
doesn’t apply, they often give content to nonstatutory review by analogizing
to APA-based review doctrines. As a result, fairly little doctrine has
developed for what nonstatutory review of presidential actions should entail.
Manheim and Watts have persuasively argued that a “more theorized legal
framework” is required to reduce the “uncertainty” and “inconsistency” of
nonstatutory review of presidential actions.193

192. An analogy here can be drawn to businesses’ choice of where to incorporate.
Even if Delaware’s corporation code is not that much more business-friendly than
another state’s, a majority of companies still choose to incorporate in that state because
its larger body of business precedent reduces the costs of legal uncertainty in business
decisions.
193. Manheim & Watts, supra note 35, at 1971.
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2. Cause of Action and Sovereign Immunity
Section 702 of the APA provides a cause of action to those aggrieved by
agency action and, thanks to an amendment in 1976, also waives sovereign
immunity for such claims.194 This removes what could be substantial hurdles
for plaintiffs suing the government. Lower courts have interpreted the APA’s
waiver of sovereign immunity as applying to claims against agencies even
when a plaintiff’s cause of action is not premised on the APA.195 The
Supreme Court has not yet answered that question.196
At least in theory, nonstatutory review should provide its own equitable
cause of action,197 and because the defendant in a nonstatutory-review suit is
the officer rather than the government itself, sovereign immunity should not
apply, regardless of the scope of the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity.198
As the D.C. Circuit explained in Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, the most
significant case allowing nonstatutory review against the President, “if the
federal officer, against whom injunctive relief is sought, allegedly acted in
excess of his legal authority, sovereign immunity does not bar a suit.”199 This
is because the sovereign has empowered the officer to act only within his
lawful scope, so actions taken outside legal authority are deemed the acts of
the officer, not the sovereign.200 “There is no sovereign immunity to waive –
it never attached in the first place.”201
But that doctrine relies on a legal fiction that has vexed judges
throughout the nation’s history. Writing shortly after Franklin and arguing

194. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2018) (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. An action in a court of the United
States seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or
an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under
color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the
ground that it is against the United States or that the United States is an indispensable
party.”).
195. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1328–29 (D.C. Cir.
1996).
196. Kathryn Kovacs has persuasively argued that the courts of appeals have
gotten this wrong, and the sovereign immunity waiver should be subject to the other
limitations in the APA, such as the requirement for final agency action. Kathryn E.
Kovacs, Scalia’s Bargain, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1155, 1157 (2016). Were the Supreme
Court to adopt Kovacs’s view, the availability of the APA’s sovereign immunity
waiver would turn on the same finality analysis that produced Franklin.
197. Nonstatutory review has a long pedigree. It is how William Marbury sued
James Madison and how Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. sued Charles Sawyer. See
generally, Siegel, supra note 198.
198. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882); see also Ex Parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908).
199. Reich, 74 F.3d at 1329.
200. Id. at 1327.
201. Id. at 1329.
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that the President should still be susceptible to suit, Professor Jonathan Siegel
argued that courts should employ an updated version of nonstatutory review
to provide remedies to those aggrieved by Presidents’ unlawful statutory
actions.202 Siegel traced the history of nonstatutory review;203 according to
his account, nonstatutory review sprung from the remedial imperative: every
right deserves a remedy.204 When the doctrine of sovereign immunity
threatened to prevent individuals aggrieved by government action from
vindicating their rights, courts devised nonstatutory review as a
workaround.205 Plaintiffs could sue executive officers in their personal
capacities, and the court would entertain the legal fiction that the defendant
was an individual, rather than the government, in order to circumvent
immunity.206 Initially, nonstatutory review could be used only when an
executive officer committed an affirmative unlawful act because the legal
fiction was strongest when the actor had stepped outside his lawful
governmental duties.207 But later, nonstatutory review expanded to also cover
actors who were simply following orders or who made an unlawful
omission.208 As nonstatutory review expanded even further, it not only
blocked the defense of sovereign immunity but also provided a cause of
action.209
Siegel argued that nonstatutory review ran into problems, however,
when judges did not keep in mind the falsity of the legal fiction.210
Sometimes, judges woke up from the dream.211 When that happened, they
would promptly dismiss the case on sovereign immunity grounds because the
true defendant was the government and the individual defendant had just been
carrying out government business.212 Other times, courts told the lie so well
that they started to believe it.213 When courts took the legal fiction too
seriously, they forgot that this was really a suit against the government.214
Then, a court might dismiss the case because the individual defendant had
resigned or turned out not to be the person most responsible for the harm.215
Had the court remembered that the real point here was to sue the government,
it would have been more willing to simply substitute in a different nominal
202. See Siegel, supra note 179, at 1670–78.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1627–28.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1632–34.
207. Id. at 1637–39.
208. Id. at 1639–44.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1644–47.
211. Id. at 1647–50 (citing Weeks v. Goltra, 7 F.2d 838, 845 (8th Cir. 1925), aff’d,
271 U.S. 536 (1926)).
212. Id. at 1649–50 (citing Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516, 529 (1899)).
213. Id. at 1650–57.
214. Id. (citing Secretary v. McGarrahan, 76 U.S. 298, 313 (1869)).
215. Id. at 1651–52.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020

29

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 6

100

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

defendant.216 Because of these issues, Siegel described the historical version
of nonstatutory review as a regime that “can easily lead to error.”217 His
proposed version would not suffer from these faults, but he offered no reason
to believe that today’s judges are any better at handling legal fictions. If
anything, modern textualist courts may be more resistant to them.218
Even if courts do not fall prey to these errors in resurrecting nonstatutory
review, Siegel’s article is largely theoretical. As he acknowledged, the
Supreme Court has never used nonstatutory review to issue an injunction
against the President.219 And Siegel likewise acknowledged that courts’
general anxiety about interfering with the President’s constitutional powers,
even when reviewing statutory action, might make judges hesitant to give
nonstatutory review much bite.220 As noted above, it seems likely but not
certain that judicial review extends at least to whether presidential action has
statutory authority, but in many cases, even that limited review might be cut
off by concerns about immunity, presidential discretion, or the scope of the
President’s constitutional powers.221
When suits are brought against an agency that worked together with the
President, those prudential concerns about deference to the President may be
reduced to some extent. But given its somewhat unreliable history,
nonstatutory review likely will continue to be less reliable than APA review
in providing a cause of action and waiver of sovereign immunity.

3. Rationality Review
The APA directs reviewing courts to “hold unlawful and set aside”
agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.”222 In implementing this provision, the
D.C. Circuit created and the Supreme Court ratified what is known as “hardlook review.”223 Courts look at the administrative record to ensure that the
agency’s policy decisions were rational and supported by sufficient
evidence.224
Nonstatutory review likely does not extend that far. Although it is
difficult to prove a negative, no court has ever used nonstatutory review to
question the rationality of an executive order. As it stands, courts applying
nonstatutory review to executive orders, as the Supreme Court did in Trump

216. Id.
217. Id. at 1707.
218. Id. at 1705–06.
219. Id. at 1612.
220. Id. at 1698.
221. Id. at 1637–39.
222. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018).
223. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983); Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
224. Id.
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v. Hawaii, generally limit their review to whether they comply with statutes
and the Constitution.225
Scholars have made various proposals. Stack has argued that courts
should provide deeper substantive review of presidential actions in at least
one circumstance.226 When statutes require the President to make certain
findings before she is empowered to act, Stack argues that courts should
inquire into whether the required conditions precedent were actually met.227
Even if adopted, this intervention is fairly narrow and comes far short of hardlook review. David Driesen has gone further to argue that courts should apply
something akin to arbitrary and capricious review to ensure that presidential
orders are supported by facts, as well as by a rationale adequately connected
to the claimed source of legal authority.228 Kathryn Kovacs, in a forthcoming
article, argues that Franklin was wrongly decided and the APA’s arbitrary and
capricious standard (as well as its procedural requirements) should apply to
the President.229 Manheim and Watts take a middle ground position, arguing
that the President should be required to give a non-arbitrary justification for
her actions in the text of her orders, but that she should not be required to
produce the long preamble and administrative record that accompanies an
agency rulemaking.230 These proposals are intriguing, but none appear on the
verge of implementation. Therefore, as it stands, nonstatutory review does
not provide any hard-look review of presidential actions.

4. Procedural Review
The APA imposes various procedural requirements on agencies. The
most well-known is that “informal” legislative rules must go through a notice
and comment procedure with specific requirements for how an agency must
notify the public of its plans and how it must take feedback on those plans.231
Judges have created additional doctrines to set parameters for these processes,
like the logical outgrowth test for rules.232 By contrast, there are no procedural
requirements at all for presidential actions. They don’t take any particular
225. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
226. Stack, Reviewability, supra note 26, at 303–04.
227. Id.
228. David M. Driesen, Judicial Review of Executive Orders’ Rationality, 98 B.U.
L. REV. 1014, 1015 (2018).
229. See generally Kovacs, supra note 28; see also Kathryn E. Kovacs, Trump v.
Hawaii: A Run of the Mill Administrative Law Case, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE &
COMMENT (May 3, 2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/trump-v-hawaii-a-run-of-the-milladministrative-law-case-by-kathryn-e-kovacs/ [perma.cc/G9VX-JEGM] (arguing that
the Supreme Court was wrong in Franklin and that presidential orders should be
subject to APA review).
230. Manheim & Watts, supra note 35, at 1814.
231. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018).
232. See, e.g., Air Transp. Ass’n v. CAB, 732 F.2d 219, 235 (D.C Cir. 1984);
Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 547 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
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form: there are numbered executive orders, proclamations, memos to agency
heads, and so forth.233 Litigants have had some success suing Trump’s
agencies for their sloppy procedural missteps, but no such procedural suit can
be brought against the President under nonstatutory review.234
Stack argues that the lack of procedural requirements for the President
is one reason not to read implied authority for the President into statutory
delegations to other executive officials.235 He suggests that allowing the
President to take on statutory authority would “short-circuit the administrative
process that Congress typically specifies for agency actors.”236 And while the
President might lend political legitimacy to the administrative state, process
has also been “a persistent source of legitimacy for administrative action.”237
But under Unitary Executive Theory, when the President assumes the power
to execute a law in the place of the express delegee, she can exercise that
authority without following the procedural requirements that would otherwise
apply to the delegee.238 In this way, Stack argues, “statutory constructions
that imply directive powers disrupt Congress’s interest in specifying the
procedures through which statutory delegations should be implemented.”239
And there’s nothing that nonstatutory review would do about it.

5. Deference to Statutory Interpretation
Under Chevron, agencies receive deference for their reasonable
interpretations of the statutes they administer.240 Although courts are highly
deferential to the President, they have not established any particular deference
regime for evaluating his statutory interpretations. Stack has argued that the
President should be granted Chevron deference in his interpretations of
statutes, but only for statutes that explicitly grant her authority.241 When the
President tells agencies how to interpret statutes that delegate authority
directly to the agency, Stack argues the President should receive only more
circumscribed Skidmore deference, even from the agency.242 Given courts’
233. See supra notes 187–90.
234. See e.g., Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019); Texas v.
United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam, 136 S. Ct. 2771 (2016).
235. Stack, President’s Statutory Powers, supra note 26, at 317–18.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 318.
239. Id.
240. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844–45
(1984).
241. Stack, President’s Statutory Powers, supra note 26, at 299–312.
242. Id. at 314. Under Skidmore deference, courts defer to agency interpretations
only insofar as the agency’s reasoning is persuasive. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will
depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”).
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deferential treatment of the President, Stack’s argument seems unlikely to be
implemented. It thus remains unclear what form of deference courts will grant
to statutory interpretations within nonstatutory review.

6. Remedies
The scope of remedies available under the APA is well-established. In
general, declaratory and injunctive relief are available against agencies;
monetary damages are not.243 By contrast, courts wary of separation of
powers concerns are extremely hesitant to issue an injunction against the
President. Some, including Justice Scalia in his Franklin concurrence, have
questioned whether the courts can enjoin the President at all.
However, this aspect of nonstatutory review might not pose a significant
impediment to the efficacy of judicial review of executive teamwork. Because
the President almost never personally executes his orders, injunctive relief
against his subordinates will often afford full relief in suits challenging joint
presidential-agency actions.
The foregoing demonstrates that APA and nonstatutory review differ in
significant ways. Scholars have offered proposals for what nonstatutory
review should entail, but in practice it remains largely amorphous. Thus, the
choice between review regimes is significant.

II. THE MESSY BUSINESS OF APPLYING THE APA TO EXECUTIVE
TEAMWORK
This Article is the first of which I am aware to conduct a comprehensive
survey of the caselaw interpreting Franklin. My research reveals that lower
courts have had difficulty applying the President’s APA exemption to facts
that differ from those in Franklin and Dalton. Two situations present easy
cases. First, it is clear that when a plaintiff attempts to sue the President
directly, including the Trump-era trend of pre-enforcement suits directly
against Executive Orders, the APA does not apply. Second, pursuant to
Franklin and Dalton, when the President works together with an agency, and
the President is responsible for the last nondiscretionary act, lower courts
follow Franklin to hold that the APA does not apply. But in practice, that
seems to be the rarer circumstance by far. It is much more common that the
President acts first, issuing an order or directive, and then leaves the agency
to iron out the details. And in those situations, the lower courts are split. Some
courts have cabined Franklin to the context of finality, such that the APA
applies so long as the President doesn’t act last. Plaintiffs can just wait for an
agency to implement the President’s directives, sue the agency, and obtain
APA review. Other courts have looked to the nature of the action. If the
action is “presidential” in nature, then the APA doesn’t apply, even if an
agency does most or even all of the work. This Part details those dueling
243. See generally Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir.
1996); Siegel, supra note 179.
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approaches, then explores their virtues and vices through a case study of
international permits for bridges and oil pipelines. For its part, the Supreme
Court has dodged the question in several cases, leaving the lower courts to
duke it out.

A. The “Last Act” Approach
The first approach to implementing the President’s APA exemption is to
limit it to circumstances in which the President herself takes the final action.
If the decision-making process ends with the President exercising discretion,
then the APA does not apply.244 But in almost any other circumstance, agency
actions otherwise final can be reviewed under the APA regardless of
participation by the President.245 When the President orders an agency to do
something, the agency’s action implementing that command will be subject
to the APA.246 Even when the President acts after an agency, if the President’s
action is only ministerial, the agency’s action might be deemed final for
purposes of the APA.
The most-cited source for the proposition that Franklin should be limited
to situations in which the President acts last is dicta in the D.C. Circuit’s
opinion in Chamber of Commerce v. Reich.247 In that case, the plaintiffs
challenged an executive order from President Clinton directing the Secretary
of Labor to issue certain regulations.248 The plaintiffs challenged the
President’s executive order directly without suing the agency.249 As such, an
APA claim challenging the implementing regulations was not part of the case,
and the court was left with nonstatutory review of the President’s action, as
discussed above.250 But in dicta, the court speculated that if the plaintiffs had
brought the claim against the agency, review would have been available.251
The government argued – and other courts would later adopt this view – that
“a cause of action under the APA is not available, even were appellants to rely
on it, because a challenge to the regulation should be regarded as nothing more
than a challenge to the legality of the President’s Executive Order and
therefore not reviewable.”252 But the D.C. Circuit threw cold water on this
argument, writing, “that the Secretary’s regulations are based on the
President’s Executive Order hardly seems to insulate them from judicial
review under the APA, even if the validity of the Order were thereby drawn
into question.”253 For this proposition, the court cited an earlier D.C. Circuit
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1324–25.
Id. at 1325.
Id. at 1326–27.
Id.
Id. at 1327.
Id.
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opinion, Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative.254 That case
explained the limiting principle of this more formalist approach: “Franklin is
limited to those cases in which the President has final constitutional or
statutory responsibility for the final step necessary for the agency action
directly to affect the parties.”255 Otherwise, the APA applies.256
In a subsequent case involving rulemaking, a district court applied this
last act approach to permit APA review of regulations issued pursuant to an
executive order (but precluding review of the President’s order itself).
Bernstein v. Department of State involved an order by President Clinton
directing the Department of Commerce to issue regulations on the export of
nonmilitary encryption products.257 The plaintiff challenged both the
President’s order and the regulations that the agency promulgated
implementing the order.258 The Court first held, disagreeing with Reich, that
nonstatutory review was not available to consider whether the President’s
order was inconsistent with the substantive statute in question.259 However,
turning to the agency regulations, the Court held that these could be reviewed
under the APA.260 The Court saw the question as one of finality: “Of critical
importance in both Franklin and Dalton was the fact that the President was
responsible for the final action under the statutes at issue.”261 Here, the
President left it to the agency to devise the final rules.262 “Accordingly, this
court will examine whether the Commerce Department’s regulation of
encryption items is consistent” with the substantive statute.263
That same year, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit observed
in City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Department of Transportation that “under
certain circumstances, Executive Orders, with specific statutory foundation,
are treated as agency action and reviewed under the Administrative Procedure
Act.”264 That is, where the President through an executive order delegates
statutory power to an agency, and in the order directs the implementing
agencies to make certain findings or take certain actions, the agency’s
subsequent decisions are subject to review under the APA. This review of the

254. Id. at 1327 (citing Pub. Citizen v. United States, 5 F.3d 549, 552 (D.C. Cir.
1993)).
255. Pub. Citizen v. United States, 5 F.3d 549, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (emphasis
added).
256. Id.
257. Bernstein v. Dep’t of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288, 1298 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
258. Id. at 1291–92.
259. Id. at 1300 (holding that “[i]n light of the recent Supreme Court decisions in
this area, this court concludes that it cannot review whether the President exceeded his
statutory authority . . . .”). This holding confirms what I argue above: nonstatutory
review is less reliable than judicial review under the APA.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Dep’t of State, 123 F.3d 1142, 1166 (9th Cir. 1997).
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agency action covers both compliance with the requirements of the Executive
Order (giving the court “law to apply” for the purposes of preclusion doctrine)
and whether the agency action is arbitrary and capricious, neither of which
would likely be included in nonstatutory review.265
Even when the President takes the final action, courts taking the last act
approach might find the agency’s prior action to be final when the President’s
subsequent action is ministerial266 or when some aspect of the agency’s action
is not subject to presidential review.267 The cases are not clear or consistent
on how much discretion the President must exercise to trigger the APA
exception. In Franklin, the President acted as a middleman, taking in data,
running a few rote calculations, and then passing along the results.268 But the
Court there found that his action was discretionary, not ministerial.269 That
appears to set a low bar for discretion.
In Public Citizen, as noted above, the D.C. Circuit took the last act
approach to Franklin.270 It held that the Office of the Trade Representative’s
completed negotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement was not
final agency action because the agreement did not carry legal consequences
until the President submitted it to Congress.271 The Court reasoned: “The
President is not obligated to submit any agreement to Congress, and until he
does there is no final action.”272 The discretionary act of submitting a treaty
to Congress, which the President is under no obligation to do, seems safely
more discretionary than the task of submitting the apportionment at issue in
Franklin, where the statute said “shall.”
But in Corus Group v. International Trade Commission, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that an agency action was final even
when it was followed by a subsequent action from the President.273 Under the
Trade Act of 1974, when the International Trade Commission finds that
increased imports of a product are causing “serious injury” to a domestic
industry, the President is directed to take “all appropriate and feasible action”
to help the domestic industry, up to and including imposing duties on
imports.274 The President can also impose duties if the commission is evenly
divided in its injury finding.275 Once the Commission makes the requisite

265. Id.
266. Here, lower courts are picking up on the dicta in Franklin distinguishing
discretionary and ministerial presidential acts. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505
U.S. 788, 800 (1992).
267. Id. at 796.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 800.
270. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549, 553 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
271. Id.
272. Id. at 551–52.
273. Corus Grp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 352 F.3d 1351, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
274. Id. at 1353–55.
275. Id. at 1355–56.
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finding, the President has wide latitude in deciding what relief to provide.276
In this case, the Commission was evenly divided, and the President imposed
a duty on certain tin mill products.277 The plaintiffs sued alleging that the
Commission was not actually evenly divided but rather had made a negative
determination as to injury, in which case the President would have been acting
beyond his statutory powers.278 The Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment
below for the defendants but did so only after finding that the Commission’s
vote could be reviewed under the APA.279 The Court wrote that, because “the
President’s action was lawful only if the Commission was evenly divided,”
the President’s “action was not discretionary, and the validity of the
proclamation is dependent on whether three commissioners in fact found
serious injury with respect to tin mill products.”280 Perhaps by straining the
meaning of the word “discretionary,” the Court found that Bennett, rather than
Franklin or Dalton, governed the case and that the agency action here passed
the Bennett test for finality.281
The problem with the last act approach is that it is hard to square with
the absolute language in Franklin.282 That case included a finality analysis
with respect to the agency’s action, but its announcement of the President’s
APA exemption was not cabined to that context.283 The Court interpreted the
statute to not apply to the President ever.284 The last act approach puts too
much emphasis on the mechanics of Franklin and not its clear directive. The
case held that separation of powers concerns militated against applying the
APA to the President.285 It would seem absurd for that holding to turn simply
on the order of operations. The Court certainly gave no indication that it
intended for the President to receive the benefit of her APA exemption only
when physically carrying out actions on her own behalf, with the APA kicking
back in as soon as some other executive officer acted to implement the
President’s decisions. Especially in the era of Presidential Administration,
with increased interactivity between agencies and the White House, the
President rarely acts on her own. In this nonbinary world, her exemption from
the APA becomes next to a nullity if any related, final agency action can give
rise to APA review.

276. Id. at 1354.
277. Id. at 1355–56.
278. Id. at 1356.
279. Id. at 1359.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Several other cases taking the last act approach are discussed infra, Section
II.D, as part of my discussion on the Supreme Court’s failure to offer further guidance
on applying Franklin.
283. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992).
284. Id.
285. Id. at 800–01.
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B. The “Presidential Nature” Approach
The second group of cases extends Franklin beyond the context of
deciding whether an agency’s action is final to emphasize the separation of
powers concerns that led the Court to exempt the President from the APA. If
the President’s discretionary choices are to be exempted from judicial review,
then plaintiffs should not be able to circumvent that exemption just because
some other official takes a subsequent action to implement the President’s
decisions.286 What is more, when Congress delegates statutory power to the
President, these courts interpret that delegation as intended to limit judicial
review.287 So even if the President subdelegates the power entirely to an
agency, the APA still doesn’t apply.
In Tulare County v. Bush, the plaintiffs challenged the President’s
proclamation establishing the Giant Sequoia National Monument pursuant to
the Antiquities Act.288 To circumvent the President’s exemption from the
APA, the plaintiffs included claims that the “Forest Service’s current
implementation of the Proclamation” violated the National Forest
Management Act and the National Environmental Policy Act and was,
therefore, unlawful under the APA.289 The U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia made quick work of dismissing these claims because the “Forest
Service [was] merely carrying out directives of the President, and the APA
does not apply to presidential action.”290 The court argued that a narrower
reading of Franklin would lead to absurd results: “[a]ny argument suggesting
that this action is agency action would suggest the absurd notion that all
presidential actions must be carried out by the President him or herself in order
to receive the deference Congress has chosen to give to presidential action.”291
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit dodged the issue. The court affirmed the dismissal
without addressing this issue because “the complaint d[id] not identify these
foresters’ acts with sufficient specificity to state a claim.”292
In the context of rulemaking, a district court opinion reached the same
conclusion with a deeper discussion of the Franklin conundrum. In Ancient
Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the court
considered import restrictions on Chinese and Cypriot coins issued by
Customs and Border Protection and the Department of State, acting pursuant
to a subdelegation of statutory authority from the President.293 The court
286. See infra notes 325–29.
287. See infra note 331–35.
288. Tulare Cty v. Bush, 185 F. Supp. 2d 18, 21 (D.D.C. 2001), aff’d, 306 F.3d
1138 (2002).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 28.
291. Id. at 28–29.
292. Tulare Cty v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1138, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 2002), aff’g 185 F. Supp.
2d 18 (2001).
293. Ancient Coil Collectors Guild v. U.S. Customs and Border Prot., 801 F. Supp.
2d 383, 387 (D. Md. 2011)
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framed the question in this way: “does an agency cease to be an ‘agency’ for
APA purposes when it acts pursuant to delegated presidential authority, rather
than pursuant to authority conferred directly to the agency by statute?”294
After noting that neither the Supreme Court nor any federal courts of appeals
had answered the question directly, the court concluded that “the State
Department and Assistant Secretary were acting on behalf of the President,
and therefore their actions are not reviewable under the APA.”295 The court
based this holding on the separation of powers: “Although agencies, such as
the State Department here, occupy a different ‘constitutional position’ than
does the President, when those agencies act on behalf of the President, the
separation of powers concerns ordinarily apply with full force – especially in
an area as sensitive and complex as foreign affairs.”296 It also found that
declining to review the agency action was consistent with Congress’s
delegating the power to the President in the first place: “by lodging primary
responsibility for imposing cultural property import restrictions with the
President, rather than with an agency, Congress likely recognized these
separation-of-powers concerns.”297
Likewise, a Ninth Circuit case that predates Franklin held that where the
President delegated authority to approve regulations, the agency’s action was
not reviewable under the APA.298 Jensen v. National Marine Fisheries
Service concerned environmental regulations promulgated pursuant to a treaty
between the United States and Canada.299 A commission issued the
regulations, which then had to be approved by the President and the Governor
General of Canada.300 The President delegated his role in the process to the
Secretary of State by executive order.301 Relying on the deference owed to
the President in foreign relations, the court concluded, “Since presidential
action in the field of foreign affairs is committed to presidential discretion by
law . . . it follows that the APA does not apply to the action of the Secretary
in approving the regulation here challenged.”302
The problem with this approach is that it insulates standard agency
processes, like rulemaking and adjudication, from APA review simply
because the President played some role. It presents the prospect that the
President could indemnify every agency action by issuing an executive order
telling the agency how to use its discretion. Or under the Unitary Executive
Theory, the President could assume the agencies’ authority and take actions
in their name, again insulating the resulting acts from the APA. While writing
Franklin in 1991, Justice O’Connor likely didn’t anticipate the extent to which
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

Id. at 402.
Id. at 403.
Id.
Id. at 404.
Jensen v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 512 F.2d 1189, 1191 (9th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 1190–91.
Id. at 1191.
Id.
Id.
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the President would become entwined with agency action. It seems unlikely
she intended to let the President protect agency actions from searching judicial
review with the swish of a pen.
The next Section takes a deeper dive into how one particular set of issues
– the subdelegation of the President’s authority to issue permits for crossborder bridges and oil pipelines – has divided the courts. This split highlights
the virtues and vices of the dueling approaches.

C. The Divide in Action: “Presidential” Permits Issued by Agencies
Because Franklin questions arise in so many different contexts, it can be
difficult to determine whether the two approaches outlined above are actually
inconsistent or whether the courts are just reaching different conclusions
based on different facts. But in a series of decisions concerning permits for
international bridges, oil pipelines, and power lines, district courts reached
opposite conclusions on nearly identical facts. And did so while making it
clear that they thought the judges on the other side of the debate were not just
wrong but egregiously so.
The cases arise under similarly structured permitting regimes for
bridges, oil pipelines, and power lines. In each, the President has delegated
the authority to issue permits to the Department of State, working in concert
with other agencies.303 The permit application is referred to the President only
when a conflict arises between agencies about whether to grant it. The
majority rule emerging from district courts in cases challenging permits is that
APA review is unavailable because the permitting decisions are presidential
in nature, even if an agency takes the only action. In reaching this conclusion,
Courts look to separation of powers concerns and to the intent of Congress in
delegating to the President in the first instance.
The most extensive discussion came in Detroit International Bridge
Company v. Government of Canada.304 This case involved the apparently
cumbersome task of approving international bridges, which multiple
constitutional actors have found to be beneath them.305 For roughly the first
two centuries of the nation’s history, Congress was in charge of the approval
process.306 But growing frustrated with the need to pass legislation every time
someone wanted to build a bridge from Michigan to Canada, Congress
delegated the task to the President in the International Bridge Act of 1972.307

303. One potentially significant difference between the permitting regimes in
question is that for bridges, the President’s authority derives (at least in part) from
statute, whereas his power over oil pipeline permitting is from the Constitution.
Perhaps not surprisingly, on average, courts seem to view actions taken pursuant to
delegated Constitutional authority as more inherently “presidential” than actions taken
with authority from redelegated statutory authority.
304. 189 F. Supp. 3d 85 (D.D.C. 2016).
305. Id. at 88–89.
306. Id. at 93–96.
307. Id. at 94.
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That statute requires presidential approval for the building of all international
bridges.308 The President then redelegated that authority to the Secretary of
State, requiring that she consult with the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of
Transportation.309 So long as those departments all agree that the permit is in
the national interest, the Secretary of State issues the permit without
consulting the President.310 In the instant case, the agencies agreed that the
permit should be issued and, therefore, the President was not involved.311
In deciding whether the APA applied to a challenge to the permit, the
court acknowledged that the President had redelegated his authority to the
agency and that only statutory, as opposed to constitutional, power was at
issue.312 However, the court still held that the APA did not apply.313 This
was because, under Franklin and Dalton, “the determinative consideration is
whether the action involved a discretionary (as opposed to a ministerial or
ceremonial) exercise of authority committed to the President by the
Constitution or by Congress.”314
The court, repeating the phrase
“determinative consideration,” also wrote, “the determinative consideration is
not whether the actions were actually taken by the President personally . . .
but whether separation of powers concerns articulated in Franklin and Dalton
apply.”315 That is, where the actions taken are “presidential in nature,” there
is no APA review, regardless of whether the President acted last or at all.316
In addition to those Supreme Court precedents, the court based its decision in
part on practical considerations: “It would be impracticable to expect the
President to make these decisions personally because that is simply not how
government works.”317 In this way, the court was recognizing that the
formalist test, taken to its logical conclusion, could produce absurd results.
And the court found in the very subdelegation of authority an act of discretion
by the President sufficient to cut off review: “When the President retains final
authority pursuant to the Constitution or a valid statute, such as here,
presidential acquiescence constitutes an exercise of discretion that gives effect
to the delegee’s actions.”318
The court acknowledged that the President’s supervision of executive
agencies could render much administrative action “presidential” in nature, but
the court cited Elena Kagan’s Presidential Administration for the limiting
308.
309.
310.
311.
2016).
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

3 U.S.C. § 535b (2018).
Exec. Order No. 11423, 84 Fed. Reg. 15491 (April 15, 2019).
Id.
Detroit Int’l Bridge Co. v. Gov’t of Can., 189 F. Supp. 3d 85, 105 (D.D.C.
Id. at 97.
Id. at 105.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 103 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 101.
Id. at 104.
Id.
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principle that the President’s involvement should cut off review only when
the agency is exercising presidential authority, rather than when the President
exercises agency authority in his supervisory role.319 This distinction seems
a bit slippery, especially given the prevalence of mixed delegations. Indeed,
in this very statute, Congress instructed the President to seek the input of the
agencies, delegating them at least some of the power in the first instance,
before the President gave it all up.320
Applying these principles, the court had no trouble deciding that the
APA did not apply because Congress consciously chose to vest discretion in
the President.321 No matter who actually took the action, the President’s
power was being exercised.
Several other cases reached the same result in the related context of
international oil pipelines. In Natural Resources Defense Council v. United
States Department of State, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia denied a challenge to the permit for the Keystone Pipeline in part
because the permit, issued by the State Department, represented presidential
action outside the scope of the APA.322 The court wrote that, “because the
State Department is acting for the President in issuing presidential permits . . .
it too cannot be subject to judicial review under the APA.”323 The plaintiffs
erred, the court concluded, by “conflating the question of whether a particular
action is final with the question of whether a particular action is
presidential.”324 Here, the action was presidential, so it didn’t matter who
acted last. The meaning of Franklin, the court reasoned, is to distinguish
“reviewable agency action from unreviewable presidential action by the
nature of the President’s authority over agency decisions, not by whether or
how the President exercised that authority.”325 Bottom line: When the
President delegates either constitutional or statutory authority to an agency,
“the agency’s exercise of that discretionary authority on behalf of the
President is tantamount to presidential action and cannot be reviewed for
abuse of discretion under the APA.”326 In this case, the decision of whether
to apply the APA or nonstatutory review was significant; because the
plaintiffs’ substantive argument was that the agency had violated the National
Environmental Policy Act – which does not itself create a cause of action –
preclusion of APA review decided the case.327 Without the APA, the plaintiffs

319.
320.
321.
322.
2009).
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

Id.
33 U.S.C. § 535b (2018).
Id. at 105.
Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Dep’t of State, 658 F. Supp. 2d 105, 109 (D.D.C.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 110.
Id. at 113.
Id.
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had no cause of action.328 As such, nonstatutory review was not a viable
alternative.
Likewise, in Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate v. United States Department of
State, the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota rebuffed another
challenge to the Keystone Pipeline because the presidential permits were
exempt from APA review.329 The plaintiffs argued that, because the action in
question was taken by an agency, it was not presidential – but the court
disagreed.330 “The President is free to delegate some of his powers to the
heads of executive departments, as he has done here, and those delegation
actions that are carried out create a presumption of being as those of the
President.”331 Finally, in a later case, White Earth Nation v. Kerry, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Minnesota rejected a challenge to the State
Department’s interpretation of a pipeline permit, observing that “the
overwhelming authority supports a finding that the State Department’s actions
in this case [were] Presidential in nature, and thus not subject to judicial
review.”332 Again, it is worth noting that the court’s decision not to apply the
APA ended the case, and it did not consider nonstatutory review.333
Despite that reference to “overwhelming authority,” another court in the
same district reached the opposite result. In Sierra Club v. Clinton, the
District of Minnesota permitted APA review of a presidential permit because
the agency’s action in issuing the permit was final, regardless of whether the
action was presidential in nature.334 The opinion did not cite Franklin or give
any extended discussion of the reviewability issue. In a somewhat conclusory
footnote, the court distinguished NRDC and Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate,
writing, “the Court respectfully disagrees with those decisions insofar as they
hold that any action taken by the State Department pursuant to an executive
order, and in particular the preparation of an [environmental impact statement]
for a major federal action, is not subject to judicial review under the APA.”335
Another recent case also opted for the last act approach in reviewing a
permitting decision, this time concerning international electric transmission
lines. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California in Protect
Our Communities Foundation v. Chu noted that the line of cases discussed
above has been “called into question.”336 The court then held, without much
discussion, that while none of the other district court precedents are binding,
328. Id.
329. Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate v. Dep’t of State, 659 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1082
(D.S.D. 2009).
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. White Earth Nation v. Kerry, No. CV 14–4726 (MJD/LIB), 2015 WL
8483278, at *7 (D. Minn. Dec. 9, 2015).
333. Id.
334. Sierra Club v. Clinton, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1156–57 (D. Minn. 2010).
335. Id. at 1157 n.3.
336. Protect Our Cmty. Found. v. Chu, No. 12-CV-3062, 2014 WL 1289444, at
*6 (S. D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2014).
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it would follow Sierra Club and allow review, “especially in light of the fact
that an agency could theoretically shield itself from judicial review under the
APA for any action by arguing that it was ‘Presidential,’ no matter how far
removed from the decision the President actually was.”337
As noted, a trend in these cases is that the opinions often suggest the
contrary position is not just wrong but absurd. They might all be right.

D. SCOTUS Dodges the Question
On several occasions, lower courts have applied the formalist last act test
to limit Franklin in cases that eventually went to the Supreme Court, but for
various reasons, the Justices have decided the cases on other grounds each
time.
One example is House of Representatives v. Department of
Commerce.338 In that case, a three-judge District Court panel distinguished
Franklin, even though the exact same statutory framework was involved,
holding that the Census Bureau’s plan to use statistical sampling as part of the
2000 census did constitute final agency action.339 The court distinguished the
cases because the challenge to the sampling method “affects the manner in
which the decennial census will be conducted in order to generate the number
– and the only number – that the President will receive from the Secretary.”340
The reasoning was confusing, but the idea seemed to be that while the
President might have the discretion to tell the Secretary to count overseas
military personnel differently, she would not have the discretion to tell the
Secretary to redo the entire census. Therefore, the 2000 Census Report was
final agency action for the purposes of this case.341
The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds.342 As part of the
political fight over the Census Bureau’s plan to use statistical sampling,
Congress passed and the President signed legislation partially overriding
Franklin just in this context.343 The statute provided a cause of action to sue
in federal court over “the use of any statistical method” in the census and
specifically stated that the Bureau’s census plan “shall be deemed to constitute
final agency action regarding the use of statistical methods in the 2000
decennial census.”344 And the Supreme Court held that this legislation
“eliminated any prudential concerns . . . .”345

337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
(1999).
343.
344.
345.

Id.
11 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 1998), aff’d, 525 U.S. 316 (1999).
Id. at 93.
Id.
Id.
Dep’t of Commerce v. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 328–29
Id. at 326.
Id. at 326–28 (emphasis added).
Id. at 328.
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Similarly, in Judicial Watch v. National Energy Policy Development
Group, the District Court opinion included a lengthy discussion denying the
government’s motion to dismiss APA claims against agency heads, even
though the Vice President was also one of the named defendants.346 The court
declined to address whether the Vice President shares the President’s
exemption from the APA.347 As for the APA claims against agencies, the
court denied the motion to dismiss and held that agency heads’ decisions to
hold subcommittee meetings without complying with the Federal Advisory
Committee Act (“FACA”) constituted final agency action.348 Relevant to this
Article, the court wrote that for purposes of the APA, “there is no statutory
basis for distinguishing between actions taken by an agency head as an advisor
to the President and actions taken as the administrator of the agency.”349 And
prudential reasons counseled against a broad reading of Franklin: “Given the
vast number of agency actions that include an element of advice-giving, to
hold that a decision made by the head of an agency while serving in an
advisory role to the President is not subject to the APA would render a large
number of agency actions unreviewable.”350 The court thus recognized that
absurd results can follow from reading Franklin too broadly, holding “that an
action that otherwise would qualify for the APA’s definition of ‘agency
action’ does not fall outside the coverage of the APA simply because the
agency head acts in an advisory capacity to the President.”351 But by the time
the case made it to the Supreme Court in Cheney v. U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia, only the claims directly against the Vice President were
still at issue, and the lower court’s judgment was reversed on unrelated
grounds.352
Finally, in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s en banc
decision enjoining President Trump’s travel ban, the court addressed the
applicability of the APA in response to claims from the government that the
plaintiffs lacked a cause of action.353 A plurality of the Fourth Circuit
acknowledged that the APA does not apply to the President but held that the
plaintiffs could still invoke the APA against the various agencies tasked with
implementing the travel ban.354 For this proposition, the court cited dicta from

346. Judicial Watch v. Nat’l Energy Policy Dev. Grp., 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 34–41
(D.D.C. 2002)
347. Id. at 35.
348. Id. at 40.
349. Id. at 39.
350. Id. at 39–40.
351. Id.
352. 542 U.S. 367 (2004) (mentioning the APA only in passing). On remand from
the Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit explained in a footnote that the APA claims were
no longer part of the case because the agency defendants had all complied with the
trial court’s discovery orders. In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 724 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
353. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 254 (4th Cir. 2018)
(en banc).
354. Id. at 284.
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Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, which was clearly on point, and Justice
Scalia’s concurrence in Franklin, which might have been only partially
relevant.355 As discussed above, Justice Scalia’s concurrence argued that even
where direct review of the President’s actions is precluded, “[r]eview of the
legality of Presidential action can ordinarily be obtained in a suit seeking to
enjoin the officers who attempt to enforce the President’s directive.”356 The
relevance of this citation is at least somewhat doubtful because Justice Scalia
was likely talking about the availability of nonstatutory review against the
President’s subordinates in such a situation, rather than about the applicability
of the APA. Regardless, when the Supreme Court decided the statutory claims
in the travel ban case, it dodged this issue: “[W]e may assume without
deciding that plaintiffs’ statutory claims are reviewable, notwithstanding
consular nonreviewability or any other statutory nonreviewability issue, and
we proceed on that basis.”357
In sum, the Supreme Court has not expounded on the contours and limits
of its one paragraph in Franklin exempting the President from the APA
despite a few opportunities to do so. This puts increasing pressure on the
lower courts to parse the meaning of Franklin, especially as the number of
lawsuits challenging joint presidential-agency actions surges during the
Trump era.
As this Part has shown, the courts have not seemed up to the task. Both
sides accuse the other of absurdity, and perhaps they are both right. The
formalist last act camp’s approach has the virtue of limiting the violence that
Franklin can do to the traditional means of reviewing agency action. But its
focus on finality is difficult to justify. Franklin exempted the President from
the APA across the board.358 It made this pronouncement in the context of a
finality analysis only because that was the issue in the particular case.359 The
presidential nature camp’s approach might seem more faithful to the
President’s blanket exemption, but at what cost? It is equally absurd to
insulate agency actions from judicial review simply because the President told
the agency what to do. Both approaches apply a blunt instrument where a
scalpel is needed.

III. A SENSIBLE LINE BETWEEN APA AND NONSTATUTORY REVIEW
In this Part, the Article attempts to succeed where the lower federal
courts have failed. I propose a more nuanced approach that respects the
President’s unique position in our government without sacrificing the value
of holding the Executive accountable to the rule of law. This Part begins by
discussing the existing literature’s (fairly limited) normative prescriptions for
355. Id.
356. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 828 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
357. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2407 (2018).
358. Franklin, 505 U.S. at 801.
359. Id. at 796.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss1/6

46

Powell: Policing Executive Teamwork:

2020]

EXECUTIVE TEAMWORK

117

defining the scope of the President’s APA exemption. It then proposes the
“agency nature” approach and offers both doctrinal and political defenses of
the proposal.

A. Others’ Ideas
No scholar has previously dedicated any extended treatment to the
predicate question of how to draw the line between agency and President for
the purposes of applying Franklin. Several of the scholars cited previously in
this Article have addressed the issue in passing, but they provide no clear way
forward.
Kagan discussed the possible objection, suggested by scholars like Peter
Strauss,360 that Presidential Administration will lead to lawlessness because
courts will not stop illegal presidential actions.361 She writes that, since
Marbury, “the Court has posited a sphere of ‘superstrong’ presidential
discretion over political matters, not amenable to judicial control; but never
has the Court indicated, nor could it consistent with rule of law principles, that
all exercises of presidential authority fall within this zone.”362 How a court
should think about the contours of this zone, she does not say. In a footnote,
Kagan mentions the possibility of nonstatutory review. “Even assuming APA
review were unavailable in such cases, courts potentially could review outside
the APA framework certain presidential action alleged to exceed statutory
authority.”363 She writes that although Dalton v. Specter precluded review of
presidential action, that case pertained to a statute granting the President openended discretion.364 “Outside, no less than inside, the APA framework, the
question of congressional intent with respect to reviewability looks very
different when the delegation is a bounded one to an agency official.”365
Implicit in this discussion of nonstatutory review is a remarkable
implication: Kagan seems to be acknowledging that the President’s direction
of agency decision-making could cut off APA review of those decisions,
leaving litigants hoping to challenge agency action with nonstatutory review.
As discussed above, this is not an inconsequential substitution of judicial
review regimes. In practice, nonstatutory review is far more limited, even
than the more deferential review that Kagan proposes for presidentially
directed agency actions. This presents a possible tension in Kagan’s article:
Her proposals for altering Chevron and hard look review to provide greater
deference to the President are tied to the APA, but the APA might not apply
at all to these presidentially directed decisions.
Stack sharply disagrees with Kagan and argues that the President should
be treated like an agency when exercising statutory powers and should,
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.

Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965 (1997).
Kagan, supra note 25, at 2350–51.
Id. at 2351.
Id. at 2351 n.402.
Id.
Id.
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therefore, be subject to searching judicial review for statutory compliance,
receive Chevron deference, and so forth.366 But he fails to address in any
depth how a litigant can hale the President into court in the first place. He
also says little about how a plaintiff should decide whether to sue the President
or the executive officers through whom she acts. Stack acknowledges that the
APA does not apply to the President and that there is no judicial review of
decisions committed to the President’s discretion.367 Yet he argues that “just
because review for abuse of discretion is not available does not mean that
there is no review. Rather, courts still may review a president’s assertion of
statutory power to determine whether it is authorized by statute.”368 Stack
writes that although there is much scholarly interest in suing the President in
her own name, an easier path to judicial review is to sue whatever executive
officer is tasked with implementing the order.369 Stack writes that in such a
suit, “the cause of action may be based either on the APA or on so-called
nonstatutory review.”370 Stack does not elaborate on this point. It seems
somewhat unlikely that all it would take for a plaintiff to sweep the President’s
decisions back into the arms of the APA is to sue some officer who helps
implement her order. Rather, such a suit would prototypically seek
nonstatutory review. By lumping those two causes of action together, Stack
seems to gloss over the possibility that those options are not equivalent with
respect to the type and strength of review that they offer.
Stack returns to these issues in another article that argues the President
should receive deference only when interpreting statutes that delegate power
to her by name.371 Because Stack is primarily concerned with what mixed
delegations say by negative implication about whether the President has
power to direct agencies when a delegation is to the agency alone, she does
not focus on how a mixed delegation might affect the choice of judicial review
regime.372 In arguing that Congress has reason to be intentional in its choice
of delegee, Stack observes that, because of Franklin, “Congress’s choice of
delegate determines whether the Administrative Procedure Act applies.”373
Thus, if Congress wants to preclude APA review, it can delegate power
explicitly to the President. But at the same time, Stack suggests, seemingly in
agreement with Kagan, that Franklin “should not bar judicial review under
the APA when the President directs an agency action under a statute that
grants power to the agency.”374 The scope of this statement is not entirely
clear, but it would seem to apply only to statutes that give full authority to an
agency. Specifically with respect to judicial review of actions taken pursuant
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.

See generally Stack, Statutory President, supra note 26.
Id. at 555.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 556.
Stack, President’s Statutory Powers, supra note 26.
Id. at 290 n.121
Id.
Id.
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to mixed delegations, then, Stack provides little guidance. The correct
application of Franklin in this situation is not obvious.
For their part, Manheim and Watts fairly read Franklin as foreclosing
APA review of executive orders, which gives them an opening to argue for
what review regime should apply to such presidential directives.375 They also
shrewdly recognize the possibility that executive teamwork might complicate
matters: “A plaintiff seeking to contest the lawfulness of a presidential order
nevertheless might activate some of the APA’s provisions by bringing an
indirect challenge.”376 They could do so by suing an agent of the President,
preferably a subordinate who has done something to implement the allegedly
unlawful executive order that would constitute final agency action.377 About
this possibility, the authors say that, “[f]or these lawsuits, some of the APA’s
provisions may well apply,” including the cause of action and waiver of
sovereign immunity.378 For this proposition, they cite a recent Ninth Circuit
case allowing for review of an executive order to the extent it was
incorporated in an agency rule.379
Jason Marisam addresses the impact of subdelegations on judicial
review in the context of a broader discussion of the costs and benefits of
Congress delegating authority to the President directly instead of agencies.380
Marisam argues that delegating statutory power to the President presents
significant tradeoffs.381 Delegations to the President enhance democratic
accountability and exploit the President’s comparative advantage at
efficiently and coherently apportioning tasks among lower executive
officials.382 At the same time, delegations to the President enable arbitrary
decision-making because of the President’s APA exemption.383 Marisam
observes in passing, without citation and in conflict with much of the caselaw
discussed in this paper, that “the APA would apply if the President
subdelegated authority to an agency.”384

B. “Agency Nature”: Applying the APA to Presidentially Influenced
Agency Action
It is into this morass that this Article wades with a relatively simple
proposal. The Article suggests that courts adopt the “agency nature”
375. Manheim & Watts, supra note 35, at 1778.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. See East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 909 F.3d 1219, 1246 (9th Cir.
2018), superseded by 932 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2018).
380. Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 232–36
(2011)
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 233–34.
384. Id. at 234.
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approach. In short, agencies’ discretionary actions should be reviewable
under the APA. The President’s exemption should therefore be limited to
discretionary actions taken pursuant to her own statutory authorities. This
Section will defend this proposal on both doctrinal and political grounds. But
first, it addresses whether the Franklin rule should be retained at all.
Some scholars, Kathryn Kovacs chief among them, have argued that
Franklin should simply be overturned or overridden, so that the APA would
apply to the President.385 Of course, that would solve most of the problems
with administering Franklin identified in this Article. The task of
distinguishing between presidential and agency action would become
irrelevant were the APA to apply in either case. But this Article does not
argue for overturning Franklin and instead takes the rule that the APA does
not apply to the President as a constant. In part, this is because, although the
Franklin opinion was unreasoned, some arguments support the holding. For
instance, because it is difficult to distinguish between the President’s
constitutional and statutory powers, especially in the area of foreign affairs,386
applying the APA to the President’s statutory powers might have the
unintended consequence of infringing on his constitutional powers, which
presents a separation of powers problem. And in part, this Article does not
call for Franklin to be overturned for practical reasons. The conservative
Roberts Court has shown great respect for presidential power and has
demonstrated no interest in revisiting Franklin. It is therefore more realistic
to focus on the pressing problem of when Franklin should apply, rather than
on the attractive but improbable case for why Franklin should be overturned.
With Franklin thus taken as a given, we turn to this Article’s proposal.387
385. Kovacs, supra note 28 (arguing that the Supreme Court was wrong in
Franklin and that presidential orders should be subject to APA review).
386. In Justice Jackson’s famous concurrence in the Steel Seizure case, he actually
defined the scope of the President’s constitutional powers based on the scope of his
statutory powers. His famous tripartite framework holds that the President’s
constitutional power is at its apex when he also has Congressional approval to act in
an area, and at its nadir when Congress has forbidden his action. See Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–39 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
387. There are other, perhaps less realistic, possibilities. Congress could consider
overriding Franklin. This could be done in a weaker form, applying the APA to the
President when she works through an agency, to codify something akin to the rule I
propose. Or the override could be done in a stronger form, applying the APA to the
President whenever she exercises statutory power (but not when she exercises
Constitutional power). To paraphrase Kathryn Kovacs, when the President acts like
an agency, she should be treated like an agency. Kovacs, supra note 28. Such an
override faces major obstacles. First, political will for overriding Franklin seems low.
The case was decided nearly thirty years ago, so if it hasn’t drawn a legislative
response yet, it seems unlikely that one is forthcoming. Further, a bill applying the
APA to the President would likely draw a veto, meaning supermajorities in both
chambers of Congress would be needed for an override. And even if the bill were
passed, it could face Constitutional challenges. Supreme Court Justices who take a
broad view of executive power might find an infringement on the Take Care Clause
were Congress to give the courts power to decide whether every action of the President
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First, the last act camp’s approach must be dismissed even though it is
the more attractive of the two existing doctrinal alternatives. Its primary
virtue is that it errs on the side of APA review, which gives more remedies to
more rights than nonstatutory review. But it does so through a hollow
formalism that threatens to distinguish Franklin into oblivion. Franklin
exempted the President from the APA in all cases.388 That rule was not meant
to turn on the order of operations, with APA review when the President acts
first and nonstatutory review when she acts last. Because the President spends
most of her time telling other people what to do, she almost never acts last,
and the rule of Franklin would almost never apply. And as the critics of the
last act approach note, it produces absurd results by limiting the President’s
APA exemption simply because she can’t do all his own dirty work.389 The
President’s APA exemption is meaningless if challengers of presidential
action can simply wait until one of the President’s subordinates takes an
implementing action and then obtain full APA review.
But while the presidential nature approach may be more faithful to
Franklin’s text, it goes too far to the opposite extreme. By protecting any
executive action that the President touches from APA review, the presidential
nature approach threatens to significantly reduce the availability of effective
judicial review for those harmed by agency action. In its deference to political
accountability, this approach sacrifices too much legal accountability.
Especially in the age of Presidential Administration, the presidential nature
approach presents serious risks. A President who can use her directive
authority over agencies to cut off APA review of the agencies’ actions is a
threat to the rule of law within the administrative state.
My proposal focuses on the nature of the action but gives the tie between
the President and the agency nature to the agency. My proposed rule is this:
The President is exempt from the APA only when she takes discretionary
actions pursuant to statutes that delegate authority to her by name. The
exemption would apply even if that act is followed by a later agency action.
But when agencies take discretionary actions to which the APA would
otherwise apply, the President’s involvement, as director, delegator, or
partner, should be no impediment. The simple motivation is that where the
APA and its familiar doctrines operate naturally without stepping
unnecessarily on the President’s prerogatives, the APA should apply.
Thus, the Franklin exemption would be limited to situations in which:

is arbitrary and capricious. Perhaps rightly so: when the highest elected official in the
country makes a value judgment, perhaps it should not be second-guessed by an
unelected judge. In this way, my proposal, while perhaps slightly more difficult to
administer than simply applying the APA in full to the President, more fairly respects
the balances between politics and expertise, between accountability to the will of the
current electorate and accountability to the mandates of the former electorate as
expressed through the statutory commands of Congress.
388. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800 (1992).
389. See, e.g., Kovacs, supra note 229.
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•

A statute delegates authority to the President by name AND

•

The President acts under that statute by directly exercising
discretion, even if subsequent acts by subordinates are required to
implement the President’s decision.

This rule is faithful to Franklin. When a statute gives authority to the
President, especially when a statute calls for the President to exercise
discretion, and the President exercises that authority herself, the APA should
not apply.390 And a plaintiff should not be able to obtain APA review simply
by suing a subordinate actor who implements the President’s orders.391 In that
case, nonstatutory review should be available.
In nearly every other scenario of joint presidential-agency action, the
APA should apply. That is, where an agency takes a discretionary action,
pursuant to a delegation of statutory authority from Congress or a
subdelegation of statutory (but not constitutional) authority from the
President, and that action is one that would otherwise be reviewable under the
APA, then the APA should apply. The APA was created to provide a judicial
review regime for agency rulemaking and adjudication, and there is nothing
about Presidential Administration that should change its applicability. In
particular, rulemaking should always be considered agency in nature. It is a
process that is peculiar to agency action under the APA and is never done
directly by the President, so it does not make sense to consider rulemaking
“presidential in nature” even when directed by the President.
In practice, this rule will often produce the same result as the last act
camp. For an agency action to be reviewable under the APA, it must be final.
And if the President is responsible for a subsequent discretionary action, as in
Franklin, it will render the agency action unreviewable. When the agency
acts last, that will often create an action that is “agency in nature.” But not
always. As noted above, where the agent takes a subsequent action (especially
if that action is ministerial) to implement a presidential directive within the
President’s own authority, the APA would not apply under the agency nature
approach.392
In this way, this Article’s proposal strikes a middle ground. Contrary to
the presidential nature camp, it would apply the APA to bridge permits issued
by the State Department. That is a prototypical agency adjudication, one for
which the APA regime is well-tailored. There is no reason to reinvent the
judicial review wheel just because the statutory authority to issue the permits
was initially granted to the President. Congress’s intention in delegating to
the President could just as (or more) easily have been to allow the President
to decide which agency would carry out the task, rather than because Congress
390. Franklin, 505 U.S. at 801.
391. That is, unless those subordinates themselves exercise significant discretion.
In that case, the APA would not apply to the President’s portion of the action, but it
should be possible to obtain APA review of the subordinate’s discretionary act.
392. See supra Section I.A.
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wanted to limit judicial review. On the other hand, contrary to the last act
camp (and the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in the travel ban case), I would not
apply the APA to agents’ actions implementing President Trump’s
discretionary statutory decisions to suspend travel and immigration from
certain countries. However, if subordinates took further independent
discretionary actions to, for instance, implement the travel ban’s waiver
program, those administrative decisions should be subject to review.
In the hypothetical case of a President following the strong-sauce version
of Unitary Executive Theory and spending a day writing EPA rules or
adjudicating benefit claims using statutory authority delegated explicitly to
the agency, I would apply the APA to the President. But unlike Kovacs, I
would not apply the APA to the President every time she acts like an agency
by exercising statutory power delegated to her by name. Just because the
President is wielding statutory, rather than constitutional, power doesn’t mean
separation of powers concerns are irrelevant.393 And as noted above, the line
between statutory and constitutional power is not always so clear.394 But I
would apply the APA to the President when she acts as an agency by
exercising authority that Congress gave to the agency. Congress’s intention
for the APA to govern administrative action should not be so easily subverted.
As an additional step toward compromise, I suggest, similar to Kagan’s
proposals, that courts give more leeway for agencies to consider political
influences, especially direction from the President on value choices.395 Nina
Mendelson has argued that agencies should be required to disclose the extent
to which political considerations influenced their decisions, but in exchange
for that transparency, courts should give deference to the President’s political
influence.396 This would help square State Farm, in which the majority voiced
skepticism of politics as a justification for agency action, with Chevron, which
justified granting deference to agency statutory interpretation in part on the
political legitimacy of the President.397

C. Doctrinal Defense of the “Agency Nature” Rule
Doctrinally, applying the APA to as much agency action as possible
while still respecting the separation of powers concerns that underlie Franklin
is appealing for several reasons. Chief among them is administrability.398 In
the absence of Congress stepping in to create a coherent review regime for
presidential action, nonstatutory review is unreliable, as explained in Part I.
APA doctrine developed over decades provides a familiar framework for
reviewing agency action. And the APA framework itself balances
393. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–37 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
394. See supra Section I.
395. See Kagan, supra note 25, at 2372.
396. Mendelson, supra note 152, at 1127.
397. See Kagan, supra note 25, at 2373.
398. See Stack, President’s Statutory Powers, supra note 27, at 318–19.
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accountability and discretion. It requires adherence to certain procedures, like
notice and comment, that promote transparency and accountability to the
public. And it keeps agency action within the bounds of law, by requiring
compliance with statutes, and within the bounds of rationality, by requiring
non-arbitrary decision-making. But within those bounds, agencies retain a
great deal of discretion to make policy decisions and to interpret statutes,
discretion that is and should be informed at least in part by presidential
priorities. It is not controversial that review of agency action under the APA
framework can coexist with at least some presidential oversight. Presidents
have been exerting some level of influence over agencies for as long as those
agencies have existed, certainly for the entire lifespan of the APA. For
instance, the White House has been conducting cost-benefit analysis of major
regulations for decades, and courts have not hesitated to review rules that have
passed through the OIRA process.
Concerns about protecting the President’s constitutional powers and
prerogatives are legitimate, but existing APA doctrines can do much of the
work to safeguard the separation of powers. As in Franklin, the APA’s
finality requirement will prevent review of tentative, nonbinding, or advisory
joint agency-presidential actions. Further, APA preclusion doctrine can limit
review of discretionary or political choices by the President. The APA
precludes judicial review of agency action when a decision is “committed to
agency discretion by law.”399 Courts will interpret a statute as committing a
decision to agency discretion when there is “no law to apply” or “no
meaningful standard.”400 Given their instinctual deference to the President,
judges will be even more likely to find judicial review precluded on these
grounds when the President acts than when an agency does.401 And it seems
reasonable to assume that Congress is more likely to intend power it delegates
to the President to be committed to his political discretion. In Dalton, the
Court precluded review because the statute in question committed the decision
to the President’s discretion.402 It did so under nonstatutory review, but the
same preclusion would have applied under the APA. At least in that regard,
the choice of review regime is not dispositive, and the President’s discretion
will be equally well protected under the APA.
Further, both constitutional and statutory standing doctrine can prevent
the APA’s cause of action from subjecting all of the actions that the President
takes in conjunction with an agency from being checked by a court for
legality, which otherwise might raise concerns about the court infringing on
the President’s Take Care powers. Only when a plaintiff meets the
requirements for constitutional standing403 – injury, causation, and
redressability – and shows that her interests are the type intended to be

399.
400.
401.
402.
403.

5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2018).
See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
And the Supreme Court did exactly that in Dalton.
Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 476 (1994).
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992).
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protected by the statute404 will she be able to challenge the joint presidentialagency action.
The ability for courts to use the limitations of the APA, the Constitution,
and prudential considerations to limit review of presidential actions will
prevent my proposal from making the Executive Branch subservient to the
Judicial. Given the President’s first-mover advantage over Congress and the
Supreme Court and the recent concentration of power in the executive branch,
granting the courts a bit more power to hold the Executive Branch accountable
to Congress might do more to facilitate the separation of powers than to
constrain it.
One potential argument in favor of the presidential nature camp’s
doctrinal feasibility is that their rule would apply only to control, rather than
supervision.405 The idea would be something like this: When the President is
just supervising agencies in their use of statutory power, the APA applies.
Only when the President controls the agency does the exemption kick in.
First, this view is difficult to square with the current caselaw. Where the
President subdelegates his permitting authority to an agency and the agency
then issues the permits without any input from the President, the President
seems to be at most supervising. And yet a majority of courts have (in my
view incorrectly) precluded APA review of those agency actions. More
fundamentally, drawing the line for APA review between supervision and
control raises difficult administrability concerns because one is a variant of
the other.406 When supervision becomes more hands-on, it starts to look like
control. And the point at which it passes from one to the other is even more
difficult to discern than the line between agency and presidential action.

D. Political Defense of the “Agency Nature” Rule
Politically, my proposal enforces a balance between the branches of
government without infringing on the President’s constitutional prerogatives.
Kagan and others have argued that the President’s involvement gives greater
political legitimacy to agency actions.407 But there is another side of that coin.
The President taking control of the entire Executive Branch with reduced
judicial review is itself a threat to separation of powers. It is good for agencies
to be accountable to the President. But it is even better for them to be
accountable to Congress, the body that passed the statutes empowering the
Executive Branch to act in the first place. When the President exercises

404. See Lexmark Int’l v. Static Control Components, 572 U.S. 118, 128 (2014).
405. See supra Section I.B. For an argument that the President is dutybound to
supervise agencies, see Gillian e. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124
YALE L.J. 1836 (2015).
406. Perhaps significantly in this context, both Kagan and Mendelson use the
terms “supervision” and “direction” somewhat interchangeably. See Kagan, supra
note 20; Mendelson, supra note 152.
407. See Kagan, supra note 25, at 2319–63; Mendelson, supra note 152, at 1137–
38; Stack, President’s Statutory Powers, supra note 21, at 318–19.
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statutory powers initially delegated to an agency or works together with an
agency, his actions should be reviewed under the APA standard for
compliance with Congress’s laws. Otherwise, too much power accumulates
in the Executive Branch, and the President takes power from both Congress
and the courts.
Kagan is right that political influence from the President over agencies
plays an important legitimating function.408 Congress often delegates power
to agencies in incredibly broad terms, calling on the agency to regulate in a
certain area in the public interest, but providing few specifics.409 Such broad
delegations of lawmaking power call not for the narrow technocratic expertise
of a bureaucrat but for the policymaking value judgments of an elected
leader.410 Despite broad support for some level of presidential supervision,
political influence over agencies can also be seen as delegitimating, especially
when agencies should be making decisions based on technical or scientific
evidence.411 As one example, Congressman Waxman responded to the
revelation that certain EPA actions under the Clean Air Act were influenced
by the President by calling the decision “pure politics,” rather than a “fair
process that is based on the science, the facts, and the law . . . one of the critical
pillars of our government.”412 As another example, Bill Eskridge and Lauren
Baer have argued that a public opinion poll that showed that fifty-one percent
of Americans opposed assisted suicide would not have made John Ashcroft’s
interpreting the Controlled Substances Act to outlaw assisted suicide any
more legitimate.413 For these more technical questions, Congress delegates
decisions to agencies because of their expertise, not because of their ability to
represent the popular will.414
Regardless of where one comes out on the debate about the proper level
of political influence by the President over agency action, that political
influence is not so legitimating that it renders judicial review for compliance
with law unnecessary or superfluous. As Peter Strauss has argued, permitting
executive branch discretion in a form that is “legally uncontrollable” raises
serious legitimacy concerns, which might be even more significant than the
concerns raised by insufficient political accountability.415 Strauss argues that

408. Kagan, supra note 25, at 2331–32.
409. Id. at 2255.
410. Id. at 2353 (“[A]gency experts have neither democratic warrant nor special
competence to make the value judgments – the essentially political choices – that
underlie most administrative policymaking.”).
411. Id. at 2356–57.
412. Hearing on EPA’s New Ozone Standards Before H. Comm. on Oversight and
Government Reform, 110th Cong. 1 (2008) (statement of Rep. Waxman, Chairman,
H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform).
413. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1177 (2008).
414. Id. at 1144.
415. Strauss, supra note 161, at 704.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss1/6

56

Powell: Policing Executive Teamwork:

2020]

EXECUTIVE TEAMWORK

127

a lack of legal accountability has serious implications for “what it means to
have a government under laws.”416 Thomas Merrill argues that Presidential
Administration theories have emphasized administrative law’s “process
tradition,” which emphasizes reasoned decision-making and legitimacy
through public input, to the detriment of its “positivist tradition,” which
emphasizes that “administrative bodies are created by law and must act in
accordance with the requirements of the law.”417 My proposal balances these
concerns. It recognizes the value of the President’s politically legitimating
influence over agency decision-making by affording deference within the
APA framework to his political influence. But it also recognizes that
compliance with the President’s directives is no substitute for compliance
with law. The APA, therefore, must apply to agency actions, regardless of the
President’s oversight or control of the agency’s decisions.
One might argue that Congress does not intend the APA to apply when
it delegates power to the President initially, even when he redelegates that
power to agencies. But even when Congress chooses to delegate to the
President, that does not necessarily mean it intended the APA to not apply.
For one thing, many statutes that delegate power to the President were passed
before Franklin was decided.418 It seems unrealistic to impute knowledge of
how that case would eventually come out to Congress at the time it was
making those laws. Further, historically Congress delegated all administrative
authority to the President in name.419 It seems unlikely that was intended to
commit every administrative action to the President’s discretion. A more
plausible explanation is that when Congress delegates authority to the
President in name, it does not expect her to exercise the authority herself.
Rather, the choice that is actually being delegated to the President is which
agency should be assigned the authority.420 Under my proposal, the
President’s choice of which agency ought to receive the authority is not
reviewable under the APA (or likely at all), but the APA would apply to the
receiving agency’s discretionary use of the power.

416. Id.; see also Peter Strauss, Legislation that Isn’t – Attending to Rulemaking’s
Democracy Deficit, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1351 (2010) (arguing that proponents of the
unitary executive theory subscribe to “Chief Justice Marshall’s characterization of the
Secretary of State’s foreign affairs function, as a realm in which the officer ‘is to
conform precisely to the will of the President’” without noticing “the unreviewability
that Chief Justice Marshall said would follow from this proposition, or its tension with
the ideas of § 706, Overton Park, and State Farm.”).
417. Thomas Merrill, Presidential Administration and the Traditions of
Administrative Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1953, 1953 (2015).
418. See Stack, President’s Statutory Powers, supra note 26, at 278–80.
419. See supra Section I.B.
420. See Mendelson, supra note 152, at 1138 n.20 (“An alternative interpretation
of Congress’s decision to use the word ‘President’ in a delegation, for example, is
simply that it wishes to authorize the President to select which executive branch
agency is the most appropriate implementer of a statute.”).
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CONCLUSION
Though imperfect, the APA has provided the dominant framework for
administrative lawmaking for three-quarters of a century. Over time, the
compromises embedded in the statute have made it a durable and flexible tool.
In the era of Presidential Administration, it is important to cabin the
President’s exemption from the APA so that the exception does not swallow
the rule. Even when the President is involved, nearly all agency actions to
which the APA would otherwise apply should be reviewed within that
traditional framework.
That brings us back to President Obama and DAPA. If he had written
the memo creating the program on his own letterhead, would that have
exempted the decision from the APA and, therefore, from the notice and
comment requirement? Under my proposal, the answer is no. The letterhead
is not dispositive. Congress delegated responsibility for executing the portion
of the immigration laws at issue in the case to the Secretary of Homeland
Security. If the President takes on the Secretary’s statutory authority, then he
takes on the requirements of the APA as well. Of course, that case might still
have been wrongly decided for another reason, perhaps because the APA
should not have applied to the agency’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion at
all. But the name at the end of the memo cannot decide whether the APA
applies.
Likewise, the Trump Administration is plainly incorrect that DHS’s
rescission of the parole program for Central American Minors cannot be
overturned because of the President’s plenary power over immigration policy.
The APA applies to that agency decision, regardless of whether it was
influenced or directed by the President. The relevant standard is not the
government’s proposed rational basis review, which should be reserved for
constitutional challenges, but rather the hard-look arbitrary and capricious
review of the APA, the hallmark of judicial review of agencies’ statutory
actions.
Respect for the separation of powers requires that courts defer to the
President’s discretionary choices when appropriate. But it also requires that
the President not manipulate Franklin to avoid accountability to the courts
and Congress. Exempting the President from the APA when he directly
exercises his own statutory authority, but not when he works together with an
agency to exercise its statutory authority, is the best way to strike this balance.
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